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1. Industry Background 
1.1 Goals of Integration 
One of the objectives of the European Community in completing 
the internal market by 1992 is to eliminate all current 
barriers to trade in telecommunications equipment. The 1985 
White Paper by the Commission identifies the costs of 
physical and technical frontiers that need to be eliminated. 
The "Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for 
Telecommunication Services and Equipment" spells these issues 
out in detail. Upon closer analysis, it is mainly "technical 
frontiers" due to different national equipment and network 
standards and certification requirementsJand nationalist 
procurement policies, which account for the delay in 
achieving an effective internal European market. The aim of 
this study is therefore to concentrate on the effect of 
eliminating these barriers and to estimate in sectoral and 
macroeconomic terms the possible impact on individual 
countries and the Community as a whole. 
1.2 The Products and their Markets 
Telecommunica~ion equipment is used to construct a 
telecommunications network infrastructure, for example with 
the aid of transmission and switching equipment and to have 
access to such networks with the aid of customer premises 
equipment (CPE). These three categories therefore make up the 
- 14 -
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most important market segments,in addition to a small set of 
miscellaneous products. Table 1.1 gives an overview over 
these four markets in Western Europe for the year 1986. This 
data, which is based on market surveys by the consultancy 
firm Frost & Sullivan, is one of several expert studies from 
market consultants which we have used. The reason is that in 
the official statistics no clear industry specific data sets 
exist, especially not on a comparable European basis. Bu~ 
expert studies often differ anc the figures are often 
difficult to re-examine in terms of their original data and 
must therefore be taken at their face value, as a rough 
indication at best of the relevant magnitudes involved. 
Table 1.1 indicates the dominance of central office (CO) 
equipment with almost half of the market volume. It is 
certainly the most complex piece of equipment in the market, 
determined largely by previous network investment (to ensure 
network compatibility), but also determining through its 
interface standard the major technology to be employed in the 
net~ork and CPE market. 
- 15 -
-3-
Table 1.1: European Telecom Equipment Market (1986) 
Switching Equipment 
Terminal Equipment (CPE) 
Transmission Equipment 
Other Equipment 
in Mill $ 
7050 
3600 
1950 
2250 
in Percent 
47 
24 
13 
15 
Source: Frost & Sullivan, E 882, 1987, refers to W.Europe 
The next significant market, according to the Frost & 
Sullivan definition, is terminal or CPE equipment with 
roughly 24 percent of total value, followed by transmission 
with 13 percent and a set of miscellaneous products with 15 
percent. The overall market size was estimated to be 15b US $ 
in 1986, growing to 19b by 1990. 
Different consultancy reports come to different agreements 
about the size of the market and the weight to be given to 
different product groups (Tables 1.2 and 1.3). The problem is 
apparent in Table 1.2, which-represents the individual 
Eu~opean mdrkets on the basis of another consultancy study, 
in this case by Arthur D. Little (WTIP). Its market estimate 
for the EEC Market of the 12 with 17.5bnis already above the 
Frost & Sullivan Study's market estimate of $ 15bnfor all W. 
European countries. 
- 16 -
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Table 1.2 puts the national and the EEC's market into an 
international perspective. It is estimated that the 
Communities share of the world market for telecommunication 
equipment is about 20 percent; each one of the member states 
has, when compared to the US (and even to Japan) only a small 
market share, with France, the UK and w. Germany as the 
bargest national markets. 
Table 1.2: Telecommunications Equipment Market in the EEC, 
u.s. and Japan 
1984 1986* 
$bn % of total $bn % of total 
Belgium 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.9 
Denmark 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 
France 3.1 4.4 4.2 4.6 
Ireland ·o .1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Italy 1.4 2.0 1.7 1.9 
Germany 2.9 4.1 3.6 3.9 
Greece 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Netherlands 0.6 0.8 0.62) 0.7 
Portugal 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Spain 1.3 1.9 1.6 1.7 
UK 3". 3 4.7 4.1 4.5 
(Sub total) (14.0) (20.0) (17.5) (19.1) 
us 26.41) 37.7 34.5 37.8 
Japan 6.8 9.7 7.9 8.6 
EC, us, Japan total 47.3 67.4 59.9 65.5 
World total 70.0 100.0 91.3 100.0 
Source: Arthur D. Little (WTIP) 
1) 1985; 2) 1984; * 1986 estimate is in 1985 US dollars. 
- 17 -
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Table 1.3: Telecommunications Equipment Markets in the 
Principal OECD Countries, 1984 (in Mill US $) 
public private public 
switching switching transmission 
(incl. broadcast) 
CPE 
World Market 10000 9420 14590 6495 
France 730 251 650 448 
West Germany 457 492 690 400 
U.K. 687 361 460 250 
Italy 710 129 400 131 
USA 2850 5400 5220 2830 
Japan 627 808 1520 316 
Canada 327 210 210 72 
Source: Rausch (1987, P· 20) 
Table 1.3 includes transmission equipment for broadcasting 
programs (TV and radio) which can increase the transmission 
market by roughly one third. Other studies include much of 
the office equipment market in CPE equipment, even if such 
equipment is only occasionally linked to a telephone network. 
While the exact size of the market is important for the 
actual scenario calculatioP~, at the moment the estimates at 
band suffice to indicate the broad magnitudes of these 
markets and their development potential. 
The size of the telecommunications equipment markets is 
determined by the derived demand from telecommunications 
services. At the momen;,most experts agree that in addition 
to the traditional voice segment of the telephony market, 
which makes up between 80 and 90 percent of telephony 
revenue, data transmission (including telex) will make up an 
increasing segment of the overall telephone market in the 
future. 1 While the voice market is growing at 5 to 6 percent 
1 .,In 1986, 86 percent of Telefonica • s revenue was from 
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per annum, data applications are growing at 15 to 20 percent 
per annum. It is not unlikely that revenues from data and 
image transmission may reach 30 percent of telephone revenue 
by the yar 2000. As a consequence, the weight of the CPE 
market pertaining to these applications will increase. 
In this market, different procurement rules hold, as much of 
the CPE tends to be procured by private individuals (except 
for main telephones) so that restrictive certification rules 
and incompatible standards matter more than in the publicly 
procured switching and transmission market. For this latter 
market segment, restrictive procurement rules and specific 
national standards are more of a barrier to the completion of 
the internal market. It is important to note that the effects 
of completing the European internal market by 1992 will be 
different for equipment markets under public procurement from 
those under private procurement. It is therefore necessary to 
examine the determinants of industry structure in each of 
these markets first, before proceeding to analyze the effects 
of an effective internal market. 
While the switching market may keep its current dominant 
position, as indicated in Table 1.3, the proportion of 
private to public markets is changing. Already, an increasing 
amount of switching activity is carried out at the customers' 
premise in so-called private branch exchanges (PABX). This 
traditional telephony, 7.7 percent from telex and data, 
for BT the figures were 65.6 and 11.3, for the Bundespost 
89 percent and 9 percent respectively, for Italy 88.7 
percent and 7 percent. 
- 19 -
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segment is being enlarged through the introduction of local 
area networks and other data services. As a consequence, 30 
to 40 percent of the switching market may in the future lie 
outside the public procurement realm and be subject to 
different, more open procurement conditions. 
To put the role of telecommunications equipment within a 
sector or within the economy into perspective, Figure 1.1 uses 
the concept of a value added cone (Davies, 1987). It describes 
the increasing amount of value added at each higher level of 
production. The cumulatively increasing production value at 
each higher production level is represented by an inverted 
cone. This value added chain in telecommunications services is 
intended to illustrate two things: 
The total amount of value added 1n the cone becomes larger 
with increasing telecommunication applications in the 
economy, encompassing more and more activities. 
The differences in industry structure at the different pro-
duction levels. 
If we move up the value added chain from component production 
(level one) to telecommunications equipment, we see that two 
. 
activities at the bottom are characterized by a fairly com-
petitive industry structure. The next two levels of activity, 
telecommunication networks and services, are under the realm 
·of telecommunication administrations, which usually have a 
monopoly for setting up a telecommunications infrastructure 
and offering its services. It is their preferential purchasing 
policy, in addition to technical barriers related to different 
national standards, which account for most of the current costs 
of non-Europe. 
- 20 -
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F1gure 1.1: HIERARCHICAL PRODUCTION CHAIN OF TELECOM MARKETS 
Production Individual 
Volume Production Steps Market Participants 
.................. VAS-Services } • Users of • c • ~ • Telecom Services Telecom Services 
u 
:I 
'C Telecom 0 
... Cll Telecom Networks D. 
'iii Administrations 
-
> 0 !I } > Telecom Equlpments &:. u Equipment ... Ill ... Cll Industry i: Equipment Industry 
Information services and value added network services (VANS) 
are one further production step, but they currently exist only 
for a small segment of telecommunication applications. They 
include services such as distributed data processing, access 
to data bases, electronic mail, electronic data intereYchange 
(a support service for physical distribution systems or the 
linking of component producers, assemblers and distributors) 
as well as services such as telephone marketing etc. They are 
all based on simple network functions (such as transmission 
and switching) and can therefore be provided outside the tra-
ditional network monopoly. But here, like for CPE equipment, 
different national certification rules and restrictions on the 
use of the network services (usually leased lines and the inter-
- 21 -
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connection to the public network) influence the evolution and 
integration of this market. It is therefore important to iden-
tify the market structure at each level, in order to assess 
the effect of a larger, integrated European market (Foreman-
Peck and Muller, 1988). 
The production level of interest in this study (level 2) 
concerns mainly the interaction between network operators 
(for equipment directly used in public networks), private 
network operators and customers who want to access such net-
works. In a second INSEAD study, the effects of a larger 
integrated market are analyzed for the next higher production 
level (level 3) that of telecommunication services (INSEAD, 
1988). 
- 22 -
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1.3 Economies of Scale and Benefits from Specialization 
The three main product categories to be analyzed, co, 
transmission, and CPE equipment, all allow different degrees 
of international specialization, due to varying economies of 
scale in equipment production. Economies of scale are highest 
for CO equipment. Today's modern digital exchanges are 
nothing more than high performance computers that are 
specially designed for traffic switching and network control. 
Over 50 percent of value added consists of software cost that 
are independent of market size for given switches. To produce 
tools for software and hardware testing is also very much a 
fixed cost. Some components are custom-designed, adding 
another fixed cost element so that the economies of scale are 
in effect only limited by the size of the market. Western 
Electric produces 7m access lines p.a. at one plant in the 
USA, compared to figures well below lm access lines p.a. in 
most large European countries. Even if a plant also produces 
large private branch exchanges (PBX), for which some 
component, software and testing tools might be simultaneously 
used, the European scales are still small, suffering from a 
cost disadvantage that is equivalent to 20 - 30 percent, when 
comparing a plant of 7m lines capacity p.a. to one of lm 
lines p.a. in the larger national markets. 
- 23 -
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Table 1.4: The Presence of Major Central Office Equipment 
Suppliers in Different European Countries (EEC and 
EFTA) 1986 
E E c E F T A 
B DK E F UK IRL I NL p D A CH s N 
Ericsson XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX 
GTE XX 
Alcatel XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX 
ATT-Philips XX 
GEC-Plessey XX 
Siemens XX XX XX XX XX 
Italtel XX 
Northern/STC XX XX XX 
Teli XX 
1) refers to actual plant sites; excludes Greece 
That even scales of this size are not possible is indicated 
in Table 1.4 which shows the distribution of CO manufacturers 
across Europe. Some of them have often more than one plant 
per country, with the smaller countries actually accounting 
for only a very small market demand. 
The production of CPE products is also characterized by 
signiflcant economies of scale, especially in PABX equipment. 
They are less important in the case of handsets and simple 
key telephones,as software costs do not inflate the fixed 
cost as much as i~ the switching products and variable costs 
are therefore much more significant. In addition, more 
components are standardized,off-the-shelf types, allowing 
- 24 -
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access to international specialist suppliers. This 1mpress1on 
of lower barriers to entry and fewer cost penalties for smaller 
producers is reinforced by Table 1.5, which shows the current 
distribution of European CPE suppliers. 
Table 1.5: The Major Suppliers of CPE Equipment in Different 
European Countries 
B DK 
Ericsson XX XX 
IBM XX 
GTE 
Alcatel XX XX 
Philips XX XX 
Siemens/GTE XX XX 
Northern/STC XX 
TIE 
Nixdorf 
Other Suppliers 
Sweden: 
Austria: 
Switzerland: 
Denmark: 
Spain: 
E E C 
E F UK I 
XX XX XX XX 
XX XX XX 
XX 
XX XX XX 
XX XX 
XX 
XX 
XX XY 
STA/Teli 
Kapsch, Schrack 
AS COM 
JTAS 
NL 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
E F 
p D A CH 
XX XX 
XX 
XX XX XX XX 
XX XX 
XX XX XX XX 
XX XX 
XX XX XX 
Arnper, Elasa, Telefonica, Eletronica 
T A 
s 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
N 
XX 
XX 
XX 
France: 
Great Britain: 
Matra-CGCT, AOIP, Barphone, SAT, Jeumont Schneide 
Plessey, GTC, 
Italy: 
Netherlands: 
Portugal: 
West Germany: 
Greece excluded 
Matra, Jeumont-Schneider, Dial, Telit, 
Olivetti, Safnot 
NEC, Nitsuko 
CAEP 
DeTeWe, Hagenuk, Krone, Bosse 
- 25 -
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Economies of scale in transmission equipment (Table 1.6) are 
somewhere between these two ~roducts. For the production of 
cables, large plants (relative to the size of national 
markets) are required to fully utilize all the benefits of 
large scale production, but the scale penalties are not so 
large as in the case of co equipment. While set up costs are 
high, fixed R&D costs are small by comparison, making the 
ratio of fixed to variable costs that much lower. Microwave 
transmission equipment is similar to CPE in its scale 
economies, especially for more standardized components, like 
repeaters and amplifiers. 
In surnrni~g up, most equipment production is characerized by 
significant scale economies that would lend itself to 
extensive international specialization. 
Table 1.6: The Major Suppliers of Transmission Equipment in 
Different European Countries 
E E c E F T 
B OK E F UK I NL p D A CH 
Ericsson XX XX XX XX XX XX 
Alcatel XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX 
~1arconi XX XX XX 
Philips XX XX XX XX XX XX XX 
Siemens XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX 
Telettra XX XX XX 
Other Suppliers 
Sweden: Relicana, STA/Teeli, Noika, NEC 
Austria: Kapsch 
Belgium: ACEC 
Spain: Indelec, AEG (Rail) 
France: Matra 
Great Britain: GEC, Plessey", STC 
Portugal: CAEP 
West Germany: ANT 
Switzerland: Northern Telecom 
A 
s 
XX 
XX 
N 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
- 26 .~ 
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1.4 Limits to International Specialization 
Taking the four major markets in level 2 together (CO, 
transmission, CPE and other products), we currently find 
highly protected national markets within each EEC member 
country. There is little intra-EEC trade, but a fair amount 
of exports to countries outside of the EEC (exports were 
roughly 23 percent of output, but only 30 percent of this 
goes to other EEC markets). Exports and imports are dis-
tributed fairly unevenly, with W. Germany being the greatest 
exporter to non-EEC countries, followed by France and the UK: 
the UK is the largest importer, followed by W. Germany, Italy 
and the Netherlands. Imports, at the moment, account for much 
less than 10 percent of final demand, a further confirmation 
of the national orientation of these markets. In addition to 
a small amount of intra-EEC trade, more than 50 percent of 
imports come from the USA and Japan. 1 
The reasons for this peculiarly "closed" market structure are 
threefold: selective procurement and certification policy, 
incompatible standards and "input specificity". "Buyer or 
input specificity" for individual products (the supplier 
delivers a good or a service which is specifically customized 
to the user's need, for example to allow compatibility with 
previous investment in a complex network system) is 
especially relevant for CO equipment. This input specificity, 
which is usually experienced in terms of specific national 
standards on quality specifications, makes it difficult to 
open up these national markets quickly, given the high 
1 For details see European Research Associates (1985), Castello 
(1987) and EEC (1987). 
- 27 -
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adjustment costs of moving from one type of system or 
standard to another! The degree of buyer specificity is less 
strong for transmission equipment, because the interfaces 
between different types of equipment have already been more 
or less standardized, allowing specialist suppliers to 
survive in different national markets. The same can be said 
for CPE equipment, except that here too nationally different 
certification standards play a role. 
The other important determinant of the current market 
structure is the insistance of national governments on 
maintaining a "technology base" in such an advanced 
manufacturing sector as telecommunication equipment. As a 
consequence of the industrial policy outlook of national 
governments and their network operators, there are not only 
high barriers to entry, but also high barriers to exit. Even 
if economies of scale rise significantly in certain products, 
and there are strong signs for this especially in CO 
equipment, national or multinational manufacturers might not 
be allowed to rati~nalize and to close some national plants 
in order to reap all the available benefits of economies of 
scale and international specialization. Instead, they are often 
forced to maintain a production site and a technology base in 
each national market. 
1 There may also be slackness in buyers' inertia, which tends 
to reinforce input specificity, even when technical standards 
are converging. 
- 28 -
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2. Results of the Analysis on the Costs of Non-Europe 
2.1 Status Quo Forecast 
When analyzing the benefits of European integration, an 
"anti-monde" to the completion of the internal market by 1992 
must be constructed as a reference point. These reference 
scenarios are based on what would happen if current industry 
trends were to. continue without the extra stimulus of 
Community policy. In constructing such an "anti-monde" we 
notice that significant structural changes are already taking 
place in the face of stagnant national markets, but 
increasing international competition to better exploit the 
available economies of scale, even as much of each country's 
industry remains nationalistic in output. There is a fair 
amount of rationalization already taking place and more 
apparently to come. This would imply that some of the 
benefits of completing the internal markets are already being 
realized (see Appendix 2 for a list of the current 
cooperation agreements, mergers and joint ventures taking 
place in the industry). Furthermore, the market already has 
such an international dimension, that the large equipment 
suppliers tend to look more at market aggregates when 
deciding their new product policy and their overall, long 
term strategy, rather than just looking at individual 
national markets. 
- 29 -
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It is therefore necessary to specify in more detail those trends, 
which would happen independently of the completion of the 
internal market by 1992, even if they are difficult to distin-
guish in practice from the effects of the Green Paper. After 
discussions with industry experts our "anti-monde'' consists 
of the following hypotheses: 
The movement towards joint interfaces and more common 
standards in CO equipment, combined with a more cost-
conscious procurement policy would tend to reduce bar-
riers to entry to national markets further. As a conse-
quence, we would expecte the number of firms operating 
independently in the industry (Table 1.4) to be reduced Ln 
the next 3 to 5 years, i.e. from currently 8 to perhaps 
5 major systems suppliers. Some of the subsequent specia-
lization and rationalization would take place under 
the condition that national manufacturing sites continue 
to be maintained, while major systems are being adopted 
to meet local specifications. 
We make the same assumption for CPE equipment (see 
Table 1.5 above). However, since economies of scale are 
smaller in this segment of the market, the number of 
firms departing due to subsequent rationalization would 
only be 25 percent. However, import pressure would 
be increased with imports from outside the EEC. 
In transmission equipment, the industry structure would 
remain more or less the same as would the procurement 
policies of the network operators. This assumption 
is based on the already very developed level of 
- lO -
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standardized interfaces that facilitate international 
trade, and the international outlook that characterizes 
already the present industry structure. 
2.2 A Scenario in Accordance with the Recommendations of 
the Community's Green Paper 
The next step- is to assess the policy effects that would 
arise out of an implementation of the recent Green Paper's 
Recommendations and to differentiate them against status quo 
developments. It is therefore necessary to analyze these 
proposals in detail, as they affect the market for 
telecommunications equipment. The Commission has made a 
number of proposals {Proposals A - J) and accompanied them 
with a set of lines of action and an acceleration of existing 
action lines. Under the assumption that the Council of 
Ministers will act for these recommendations to take place 
before 1992 we would expect the current regulatory change to 
take·place in a more consistent framework with a preference 
for· a wider arena for competition and the availablility of 
more standardized European-wide services. 
The major propositions that affect telecommunications 
equipment directly are Proposition A, D, E, F, G and H. 
Proposition A allows the administrations to maintain their 
current monopoly role and the supply of infrastructure. 
- 31 -
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Proposition D not only recommends that a certain number of 
standardized services should become available European-wide, 
but that strict requirements regarding standards for the 
network infrastructure should be inforced in order to 
maintain or create Community-wide inter-operability. 
Proposition E recommends non-discriminatory access to the 
network in terms of an open network provision. The mentioning 
of a consensus on standards, frequency and especially tariff 
principles is noteworthy. 
Proposition F recommends that access to the network for CPE 
equipment should be free and unrestricted, subject only to 
minimal type approval regulation. This includes access to the 
satellite network via receive-only earth stations (ROES). 
Proposition G recommends that regulatory and operational 
activities of telecommunications administrations should be 
separated to prevent conflicts of interest in the regulatory 
framework. This applies especially to areas such as C~E 
equipment, where the administration may be a regulator of 
access and certification rules while participating as a 
competitor in the same market. 
Propositions H and I recommend the full application of the 
EEC's antitrust rules (Articles 85, 86 and 90) so that 
conflict of interest issues, predatory pricing and unfair 
cross-subsidization between competitive and non-competitive 
services can be avoided. 
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Finally, Proposition J recommends full application of the 
Community's common commercial policy to telecommunications. 
Since trade at the moment in this area is mainly on equipment 
is very crucial in bilateral trade negotiations, for example 
vis-a-vis the USA and Japan. 
The likely effects of such a scenario have to be 
distinguished between those applying to the market for public 
procurement (mainly CO and transmission equipment) and that 
for customer premises equipment. The increasing move towards 
stricter European-wide standardization and Community-wide 
network inter-operability should lower change-over costs 
between different types of equipment, thereby allowing 
greater specialization and easing the potential for 
competitive procurement. Open network provision and 
more cost-oriented tariff recommendations will greatly 
facilitate the market for value added networks and the 
associated equipment necessary to support it. A more 
liberalized certification policy for CPE equipment should 
significantly lower barriers to entry. Together with proper 
ruies against predatory behavior, major effects ought to be 
seen there. 
2.3 A Scenario of Full Service Competition 
The Commission accepts the right of the 
telecommunication administrations to maintain their monopoly 
provision of infrastructure services. Nevertheless, one very 
- 33 -
-21-
large Community market, that of the UK, has already moved in 
the direction of network competition and there is a chance 
that France too, which represents almost a quarter of the 
EEC's telecommunication equipment market may move in this 
direction. In Italy too, factual network competition might 
emerge, perhaps not in a legislatively guided way, but as a 
matter of fact as has happened with broadcasting competition 
recently. These developments suggest that a scenario of full 
network competition1 ought also to be considered. It 
represents a useful reference point against which to compare 
the status quo scenario and that based on the policies envisaged 
in the Green Paper. 
The underlying features of such a scenario would be 
characterized by developments which we have already seen in 
the us, the UK and Japan. It would at least imply the 
possibility of other network providers to enter (mainly in 
the area of long-distance transmission) and for such services 
to be interconnected to the local loop and to international 
networks. 
1 Full network competition refers to the kind of network 
competition that is taking place in the long distance 
market in the U.S.A., Canada (only for the data segment 
of traffic) and Japan. Competition in the local loop 
is only partly permitted, so that complicatee. "interconnect" 
agreements are necessary to allow customers access to 
alternative long distance carriers (Huber, 1987). 
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Methodology to Estimate the Costs of Non-Europe 
Price Comparisons as Indicators of Selective Procurement 
Policy and Incompatible Standards 
Observed Price Variations 
From the Consultancy study on public procurement (WS/Atkins,l987), 
l 
plus our own interviews and market surveys, we have obtained 
estimates of the prices for different equipment types 
currently being paid in Europe and compared them with 
"competitive world market prices" •• The resulting differences 
in prices may - as a first approximation - be used as an 
indicator of the potential savings that could arise if the 
completion of the internal market would have similar 
competitive effects. In other words, one could assume in the 
extreme that the best prices that are currently obtained by a 
few national network operators could also be obtained by the 
other operators if fully competitive open procurement 
policies were used. However, as the resulting analysis shows, 
these differences must be analyzed more thoroughly before 
such interpretations are justified. On the one hand, there 
may be quality differences associated with current price 
disparities. On the other, the products being compared 
differ. For some equipment, such as co equipment, 
installation and training costs may be included in the price 
paid by one administration, but not in that paid in another. 
Similarly, software unbundling (from hardware) might make 
hardware prices for CO equipment artificially low in one 
country, while their bundling in another country may 
overstate the price differences. Furthermore R&D costs are 
often paid out of a separate budget so that such prices 
1 See Appendix 3 for firms and institutions contacted. 
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reflect only variable manufacturing cost. The same is true 
for many export contracts that form the basis for the 
observed "competitive world market prices". The price 
deviations in Table .1 must be seen with these caveats in 
mind. 
-Table 3.1: Total Telecom Equipment Investment and Observed 
Price D~viations (Public Market, 1985) 
PTO ~nvestment percent price dev~at~ons 
ECU million co transm. CPE Country 
( % more than).l} 
Belgium 500.00 120 60 40 
Denmark 350.00 30 30 40 
France 3,800.00 50 30 40 
Germany 5,200.00 100 50 80 
Greece 325.00 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Italy 3 ,'10 0. 0 0 100 30 40 
Ireland 200.00 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Luxemburg 15.00 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Netherlands 550.00 50 n.a. 60 
Portugal 235.00 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Spain 1,600.00 50 40 30 
United Kingdom 3,400.00 40 30 40 
Total 
===================================================================== 
Source: Price deviation:Country Interviews, investment!ITU 
1) These price comparisons relate to prices obtain for inter-
national tenders and these observed in the US Market after 
the AT&T divestiture. 
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Table 3.1 also summarizes the 1985 construction budgets of 
the telephone companies in the EEC member countries on the 
basis of the ITU statistics. These figures often also include 
a fair amount of expenditure for buildings, cabling and 
vehicles as a comparison with the total market estimate of 
ADL indicates. In most countries, the ITU figures would seem 
to overestimate the actual public market by 20 to 30 percent. 
The figures for Italy and W. Germany are clearly out of line 
and must be adjusted downward, to be more in line with the 
ADL figu,res cited in Table 1. 2 above. 
The next three columns in Table 2.1 represent estimated price 
deviations from competitive world markets. They are highest 
in central office and CPE equipment (where they are 
sometimes more than twice the "competitive" price level) and 
significantly lower for transmission equipment. These figures 
are however only rough estimates on the basis of 
a Delphi1 ~tudy. They, nevertheless, indicate significant price 
deviations, not only if compared to competitive prices received 
abroad (not only on export contracts, but also on prices 
paid in the u.s. and, for example in Norway, where more 
open procure~ent was practiced), but also significant 
deviations among-the countries. Belgium, Germany and Italy 
head the list for central office equipment with Denmark and 
the UK being at the low end. 
I 
1 A Delphi study r~lies on industry experts opinion, who 
are interviewed 1n an interactive way. 
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Some of these price deviations are transitory, however, and 
have to be interpreted with great care. The UK has for a long 
time been among the high-price countries, but BT has now, 
with a more open internationally oriented procurement policy 
been able to bring down its equipment prices significantly 
when it decided to abolish its system of "Court suppliers". 
Belgium too tried in 1987 to abandon its relative high pricing 
policy, which it needs to sustain current R&D and export 
activities in the equipment industry (almost 50 percent of 
Belgian output is exported, one of the highest ratios in 
Europe). Their recent price agreements (1987) have come down 
significantly, especially for central office exchanges. This 
not only reflects the productivity advances of a move to more 
modern electronic equipment, but is also a result of paying 
for some of the R&D expenses and export subsidies out of a 
separate public budget. The relatively low deviations in 
France may also be explained by paying separately for R&D 
prototypes (Foreman-Peck and Muller, 1988, Chapt. 4). 
As a consequence, these deviations are at best indicators of 
a structural imbalance. A complete move to competitive world 
market price levels in CO equipment may not sustain the 
amount of R&D necessary, even if, for the continous systems 
development, as we assumed for the "anti-monde", the number 
of firms in the industry was to be reduced by 40 percent. 
Similar arguments apply with respect to transmission and CPE 
equipment. As mentioned before, transmission is, of course, 
much more standardized so price differences are bound to be 
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lower. Nevertheless, in a number of segments, wh~re nationalist 
procurement policies are being pursued (for example in satellites 
and earth stations, fibre optics etc.) significant price dif-
ferences may be observed. 
For CPE equipment, quality, or what could be called perceived 
quality differences, may explain some variations in prices. The 
rest is undoubtedly related to fairly restrictive and protectionist 
procurement policies and cumbersome certification programmes. This 
might also apply to other products, for which we have not esti-
mated actual price differences. 
3.1.2 The EEC Green Paper fully Implemented 
3.1.2.1 The Effects on the Public Market 
Two effects are likely to be dominant. One of them arising out 
~f increased Community-wide standardization, another arising 
out of the opening of public procurement contracts according to 
the EEC Directive 77/62 1 and its more recent recommendation 84-550 . 
. 
Concerning standardization, the most important effects will be 
felt in central office equipment, where a number of dif-
ferent non-compatible systems currently exist. Their archi-
tectural conce,ption is so different, however, that stan-
dardization will not bring about increased rationalization 
or more open markets. Instead, this process will have 
more to do with the industry restructuring and the 
1 Originally, only 10 percent of public procurement contracts in 
telecommunications equipment had to be advertised Community-
wide; that proportion is to be raised to 50 percent as an interim 
proposal before a full opening of the market by 1992. 
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closer collaboration between different manufacturers, devel-
oping new switching systems. Comparin the EEC's role in 
addition to that already carried out by the other interna-
tional standard-setting bodies would lead us to suggest 
some price reductions in future switching costs if more of 
the interfaces can already now be standardized and greater 
interworkability is achieved. This suggests savings in the 
neighbourhoood of 5 to 10 percent out of a total CO switching 
market of about 5bn ECU are possible. Indirect effects out of 
increased competitive pressure because of greater compatibility 
might in the medium term lower central office costs by another 
5 percent, so that the total effects of the Green Paper fully 
implemented, at least as far as the public market for CO equip-
mentis concerned, could be as high as 0.4-0.7 bn ECU p.a. (Table 3.3). 
for transmission equipment we expect much smaller effects of 
the Community's policy on standardization. Already now, inter-
national standardization and interoperatability of transmission 
components have achieved very high levels. It is only the in-
. 
direct effects as a result of more competitive procurement that 
might help to reduce transmission costs by 5 percent. Similar 
arguments hold with respect to CPE equipment and other components. 
The second effect concerns the opening of the public procure-
ment sector in telecommunication equipment mainly regarding 
network equipment. The EEC recommendation 84-550 foresees that 
10 percent of total tenders are advertised internationally. If 
this recommendation is interpreted selectively, in other words 
applied only for those products, for which the domestic industry 
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does not have to be protected, or where the s1ze of the order is 
so small to not attract international offers, the effect could 
be quite minimal. On the other hand, if it was used to the stra-
tegic advantage of the telephone administration, for example in 
the area of central office equipment, the effect could be quite 
large. This was quite clearly seen by the recent struggle for 
the takeover of the French equipment manufacturer CGCT with a 
market share of only about 15 percent. In this case, there would 
also be an important signalling effect, as it would be difficult 
to justify a higher price for identical, but not competitively 
procured switching equipment. 
For this reason we shall make two assumptions. The first assumes 
that the 10 percent rule is very restrictively applied. The second 
assumes that the envisaged opening up reaches 40 to 50 percent by 
1992 1 and is used to the greatest advantage of the purchaser. In 
the former case, the effect would essentially be zero. 
On the second assumption, the effect could be quite significant, as 
is evident from the figures obtained in Table 3.2 on the basis of 
the price deviations in Table 3.1. The possible price reductions are 
calculated on the assumption that the deviations from world market 
prices overstate the difference to a viable long term competitive 
price level by 20 percent. 2 Nevertheless, significant savings might 
still be possible. The savings would be largest in the high price 
1 This is perhaps an overly conservative assumption, since the 
Commission could easily attempt to reach 100 percent by 1992, 
but such a policy would face less opposition from the member 
states. 
2 We assume that world market prices do not cover full average 
costs, but are closer linked to variable costs. A price de-
viation of 20 percent above world market prices may therefore 
be considered as a more realistic long term competitive solution. 
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countries Belgium, Germany, Italy, but also significant in 
France and the Netherlands. They would be relatively small in 
Denmark and the UK. 
A comparison with the price estimates that were obtained by 
WS/Atkins (1987) seems to confirm these magnitudes. They 
expect higher savings in Germany and in the UK. 
While the assumptions underlying Table 3.2 are somewhat crude 
and estimates have not been attained for all countries, the 
potential savings as a consequence of opening up 40 - 50 per-
cent of the public market could be as high as 3bn ECU (out 
of a total of 17.5 bn ECU) (Table 3.3). 
What is the likelihood of the full exploitation of a 50 per-
cent open procurement rule in the near futu~e? Given the magnitudes 
involved in the restructuring necessary to achieve such savings, 
considerable political opposition ~ould be expected. This would make 
it very difficult for the telephone administrations to adapt an 
open procurement rule aggressively. If they were able to do 
so, recourse could nevertheless be taken to extra government 
funding from other public sources to maintain the current 
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level of activity and employment in the industry. As a 
consequence, the 3b ECU savings estimated in Table 2.2 
1 
represents only the maximum price reductions possible , but 
these are d.ifficul t to achieve in practice. Instead, 
most administrations would try to apply open procurement 
rules in areas where structural adjustments costs are less 
high and easier supportable politically. This would suggest a 
minimum benefit of price reductions in the neighbourhood of 
lb ECU. But this still would require a fair amount of continuous 
prodding by the Commission, a policy not necessarily 
conducive to the spirit of collaboration needed to reach 
agreement on other issues, such as standardization and joint 
certification. 2 
3.1.2.2 Private Markets 
Table 3.2 already included estimates of potential price 
reductions in the market for CPE equipment and other 
telecommunications equipment. These effects are partly 
related to the public market, since the telecommunication 
administrations will act as a competitive distributor in 
these markets as well. Any savings attained there will be 
passed on to consumers requiring a likewise action by private 
distributors to stay in the market. To this extent the 
benefits of an open procurement policy as far as they extend 
to private markets have already been anticipated. 
1 Together with the 0.4- 0.7 bn ECU from an effective European-
wide standardization. 
2 Nevertheless, the Commission seems to have become much more 
active recently, as the number of new directives issued indi-
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There is, however, another significant effect to be 
considered, namely that of market enlargement and product 
diversification as a consequence of Community-wide 
certification according to minimal certification criteria. 
The Green Paper envisages that the CPE market should be 
completely liberalized, in other words, the distribution of 
certain terminals . on an exclusive basis by the 
administrations should stop. Furthermore, the Council 
Directive 86/361/EEC concerning the first phase of the 
establishment of mutual recognition of type approval for CPE 
(adopted June 1986) should lead to a much more common market 
in terminal equipment in which entry barriers are 
considerably lower. To achieve this end, a combination of 
standard-setting and reduced regulation (including the 
conflict of interest issue that can be solved through a 
separation of operation from certification) is necessary. 
Since the EEC's Directive also insists only on "essential 
requirements" for certification, ·the envisaged regulation of 
a eommon CPE market could come very close to the US model of 
1 
certification under Part 68 by the FCC. 
This would have important dynamic implications as is 
indicated by the recent growth in the US CPE market. Since 
these growth rates were particularly large in the market for 
simple telephones which is actually a very unsophisticated 
market. Between 1978 and 1984 the number of telephone 
handsets owned privately increased from 1 percent to 60 
percent. As a consequence of private purchasing, depreciation 
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rates dropped considerably, simple handsets were replaced much 
more frequently than before, leading to significantly larger 
turnovers (MAC, 1986, p. 4). Similar tendencies, though perhaps 
less dramatic, occurred in PABX and key systems. As a conse-
quence of faster depreciation rates, sales also increased sig-
nificantly. In addition, the increased competition reduced equip-
ment prices faster. Between 1983 and 1985 the average price per 
PABX access line dropped by 20 percent to roughly 800 US $, the 
price for key systems dropped~ 450 US$ per line1 (NTIA, 1985, 
p. 14). These results are the effects of low entry barriers and 
a larger market, allowing firms to innovate faster while at the 
same time adapting a much more aggressive pricing strategy to 
ga1n a long term market share. To sum up, the potential dynamic 
efficiency gains in the CPE market arise mainly through influencing 
the innovation process and the associated market growth effects 
as a result of lower entry barriers. If that can be combined 
with a larger market, allowing firms to innovate faster while at 
the same time adapting a much more aggressive pricing strategy to 
gain a long term market share, the increased competitiveness will 
have further innovative and price reducing effects that may yet 
further stimulate total demand for both CPE equipment and network 
use.
2 
On the basis of these considerations, the dynamic effects could 
be equivalent to 50 percent of the static potential for price 
reductions identified in Tabel 3.2 (i.e. 50 percent of .7bn ECU). 
In addition, one could envisage an increase in the market volume 
1 in current dollars. 
2 See also DIW (1984, Chapt. 3) for details on the CPE side, 
and INSEAD (1988) for details on the network usage effects 
of increased CPE liberalization. 
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of CPE equipment by 10 to 20 ~ercent above the current growth 
trajectory. If a profit margln of 10 percent of this market growth 
is used as an indicator of the extra economic benefits, a further 
economic gain of up to .lbn ECU could be achieved. 1 (Table 3.3) 
3 .1. 4 The Effects of Full Network Competition 
We have argued above that the recommendations to open up the 
public procurement market might not be carried out because of 
poli ti.cal opposition from equipment suppliers, unions and regions 
affected by the subsequent rationalization of the industry. If 
network competition were introduced however, the telecommunication 
administrations would have to behave very differently as compared 
to the scenario envisaged in 3.1.3. Given the threat of market 
entry, they could no longer afford to purchase at preferential 
rates, but would have to purchase on commercial terms, as has 
been evidenced by the changing behaviour of BT and the American 
long-distance carriers after the introduction of network compe-
titian. In this case, the full effects of open procurement that 
we indicated in Table 3. 2, could be realised easie-r. 
The effects of network competit.ion, even if at the moment politi-
9ally unrealistic, provide at least another reference point against 
which to adjust the results of the recommendations of the Green 
Paper. They also indicate the full effect of open procurement 
policy, if the Commission can overcome political obstacles from 
national administrations. 
1 A 10 percent market increase is equivalent to .4bn extra 
sales, yielding O.OSbn ECU extra benefits, a 20 percent 
increase yields O.lbn ECU. 
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3.2 An Integrated Approach 
Our previous analysis rested on separate price comparisons 
which can be observed under conditions when the European 
market is segmented. In other words, prices in some markets 
are significantly higher than in others and firms use the 
different price-cost margins in each market to sustain their 
overall production operation. In a truly integrated market 
there would be a movement towards a one-price area in which 
prices should not differ significantly from outside markets. 
Sizeable savings would then only be possible if they were 
realized through higher productivity in production, increased 
specialization because of utilization of economies of scale 
and scope and a reduction in the number of products available 
overall (even though it is likely that there will be 
increased product variety in each national market. Only in 
such an environment will a price drop of the magnitude 
suggested be feasible without the firm's in the industry 
going out of business or being unable to maintain their R&D 
effort necessary to sustain current and future levels of 
research and development and product innovation. 
To model such an evolution, we have analyzed the production 
structure of the major equipment firms (CO, CPE, transmission 
and VANS) and considered what happens under different 
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assumptions about scale and price elasticities if a number of 
countries are involved in an integration and rationalization 
process that may be characterized by the move to the internal 
market by 1992. 1 
The basic idea behind this model, which follows very much an 
earlier study on the specialization arising from 
international trade in the presence of significant economies 
of scale, is derived from Dixit and Norman (1980). Their 
basic assumption is that if significant economies of scale 
are present which are not exploited in national markets, any 
enlargement of the market (i.e. through a customs union) will 
allow further rationalization to take place. The surviving 
firms will be able to move along their declining long-run 
average cost curve, thereby passing significant productivity 
savings on to consumers, until a new equilibrium is reached. 
The size of a market is described in conjunction with scale 
economies by the number of firms it can support. In order to 
keep the model simple we assume equal sized firms. We must 
therefore abstract from the actual size distribution of firms 
tQ an "equivalent number" of equal sized firms. Some 
assumptions about these equivalent numbers are necessary, of 
course, to identify the proper number in each sector. We have 
used the following numbers for the typically large EEC member 
country, partly based on the data in Tables 1.4 and 1.5: 
1 See Appendix 1 
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Central Office Equipment 2 
PABX Equipment 3 
Telephone Handsets 4 
The price elasticity of demand is brought in by assuming that the 
size of the market depends not only on the number of supplying 
firms but also on their output per head of population. 
In a first example we assume that if six equal sized European 
countries create a customs union, integration increases the 
market size available to a national firm by a factor of 5. 1 
National producers now face a five times larger market, but five 
times as many competitors. With a relatively low price elasticity 
2 (-.53), we can show that at the new equilibrium there will be 
33 firms remaining (instead of the previous 60) and output per 
head3 increases by 30 percent. The benefits of integration are 
then directly consumed in telecom's output and in other output 
as there is to be no excessive profits in the Dixit-Norman model. 
Further simulations show that the gains in consumption (in other 
words, the benefits to the economy) as a consequence of greater 
specialization are greater, the smaller the number of firms in 
the closed national market and the greater the expansion of the 
market. This would imply that small countries, for example Belgium, 
the Netherlands or Portugal, will gain more from market integration 
1 This is only an approximation as a comparison with Table 1.2 
shows. The market expansion effects for a French or W. German 
manufacturer would be smaller, but larger for an Italian or 
Soanisn f1~w. 
2 in absolute terms and 10 firms per marKet. 
3 measuring the benefits of integration. 
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than large countries if they start out with the same number of 
firms. While this is not normally the case in other industries, 
it does seem to be true in telecommunication equipment, as 
Tables 1.5- 1.7 show. On the other hand, they may have no national 
producer left at all, a consequence which they may not be willing 
to accept for industrial policy considerations. 
As long as price elasticity is belowl·lland the number of initial 
firms large, the larger the number of firms that will remain in 
the industry. If price elasticity is abovei~L and the number of 
firms is small (an indication of significant economies of scale), 
the proportionate change in the number of firms increases. In 
other words, a high price elasticity 12ndicates that the trade off 
between specialized and uniform products favours the lower cost 
uniform products. As a consequence, the proportional change in 
the number of firms increases much more in those markets where 
economies of scale are especially important (for example CO equip-
ment), while the effects are somewhat smaller for those products, 
where economies of scale are exploited earlier. The lesson is 
clear, however. The eventual industry structure that emerges de-
pends very much on the interaction between economies of scale and 
d~mand preferences (as indicated by the relevant price eiasticity): 
- If a national market can support very few firms, because 
economies of scale are high, then the benefits of 
integration are very high, as in the case of CO equipment. 
But welfare gains drop very quickly as the initial number 
of firms increases and economies of scale effects lose 
their importance. 
- If the price elasticity of demand is high, even 
monopolists will find it in their interest to bring prices 
closer to cost so that the proportionate change in the 
number of firms is smaller and the benefits (i.e. the 
change in telecom consumptions) declines. 
1) in absolute terms 
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In other words, the big consumption ga1ns as a result of integra-
tion occur in those sectors where, because of the fewness of 
firms, the degree of monopoly is high and, because of "input 
specificity", price elasticity is low. This indicates not only 
the assumptions underlying the model, but also what we will 
have to look for in the real world. In other words, it is not 
sufficient to just look at price differences, economies of scale, 
and the benefits of integration, but also what pricing policies 
are currently pursued by those equipment suppliers who have a 
degree of market power and the tradeoff between economies of 
scale and specialization. 
3.3 An Assessment 
We attempted to identify the effect of the completion of the 
internal market by first analyzing the determinants of the 
current industry structure, secondly observing significant pr1ce 
differences within the EEC (compared to the rest of the world), 
and on this basis predicted the likely effects of the full im-
plementations of the Green Paper on market prices and volume. 
The figures were based on two main scenarios: firstly, a status quo 
scenario where current trends continue; and, secondly, based on 
the Green Paper, a comparative scenario allowing for the effects 
of standardisation and with two levels of procurement liberalisation, 
one at 40 percent, the other at 100 percent. The gains from stan-
dardisation (because of better exploitation of economies of scale) 
were estimated at 0.85bn ECU to l.lbn ECU. The additional gains 
from competitive procurement are estimated at 2.2bn ECU under the 
40 percent scenario and 3.7bn ECU under the 100 percent scenario. 
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So, totall1ng all effects, these can vary between 3.05bn ECU and 
4.80bn ECU, depending on the degree of openness of the procure-
ment market. 
Table 3.3: Possible Effects Under the Green Paper Scenario 
(in billion ECU) 
Effects of Effects from procurement 
standardis- liberalisation 
Products ation: 40-% liberalized 100% liberalized 
Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic 
Central office 0.25/ 0.2 
switching 0.5 
0.8 1.3 I 
i 
I 
Transmission 0.2 
Customer 
Premises 0.1 
Equipment 
0.4 0.5 I I I 
0.4 ~ 0,2* 0.7 ~ 0 .s * 
I I 
I 
Other 0.1 0.4 
-' 
0.7 J 
Total 0.25/0.5 0.6 2.0 0.2* 3.2 0.5* 
* Market expansion effects 
These findings were supported ih'a theoretical model that analyzes 
the tradeoffs between market enlergement, economies of scale and 
price elasticity and the likely equilibrium that would result in 
terms of industry structure. 
Nevertheless, the positive results so far should not hidefurther 
stumbling blocks to integration. It seems that national industry 
·objectives and differentiated standards will continue to play a 
rolefor a time to come. The full fruits of integration can only 
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take place, if some common agreement between the governments con-
cerned can accompany this restructuring, for example, about 
where centers of R&D and the relevant national technology base 
ought to be located (as in the case of the Airbus Consortium), 
etc. 
4. Other Points 
The major effects of completing the European market in 
telecommunications equipment ought not to be seen on the 
industry itself, but on the users of these products, that 
means telecommunication network operators and the users of 
their services: 
The more efficient and the more flexible and versatile 
such services can be provided, the greater will be the 
productive benefits at the higher levels of production. 
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The more competitive and the more flexible the 
interlinkage between demand for old and new services and 
equipment suppliers can be made, the faster the process 
of innovation, the quicker the benefits of the 
technology potential inherent in modern 
telecommunication equipment can be passed on to the 
economy as a whole. 
Obviously, the effects of more innovative network provision 
are significantly related to the benefits of more efficiently 
organized input markets. But telecoms equipment is only one 
of the inputs; labor, buildings and land is another. For 
these ~ther inputs too, preferential criteria often play a 
role, leading to cost inflation. It is therefore also 
important to see to what extent savings in the other input 
markets are possible and how they can be realized and 
activated, not only to reduce the production cost of-a key 
input into the economy, but also to free resources for other, 
more productive uses. 
Opening up an effective internal EEC market to outside 
suppliers also implies something about the degree of 
international specialization to be realized. Those markets 
that have already opened their telecommunications equipment 
sector to outside competition (such as the u.s. and to some 
extent the UK) have found that in the less sophisticated 
product market, for example in simple telephone sets and key 
telephones, Far Eastern suppliers have a definite advantage 
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and have gained important market shares. Is this result also 
to be expected with the completion of the internal market? If 
there was no suitable transition period and the domestic 
suppliers were not adequately prepared, such a scenario is 
certainly likely. But our interview evidence also suggests 
that already now assembly costs for these types of product 
tend to be very low (below 10 percent of f.o.b. price). As a 
consequence, there is little reason to assume that even for 
those products a fully rationalized production system cannot 
be set up, which can compete effectively with low-cost 
suppliers form the Far East in order to maintain a 
significant EEC presence in these markets as well. 
5. Conclusion 
In summing up we find significant savings as a result of 
moving towards the completion of the European Community in 
telecoms equipment. The reasdns are insufficient exploitation of 
scale and specialization economies as a result of limited 
national markets and the insufficient competitive pressure 
because of protective procurement policies. Trade is also 
hampered by insufficient standardization and excessive 
certification requirements in the CPE market. In all telecom 
applications, the geographical enlargement of the 
telecommunications equipment market would have important 
consequences. To move from a national regulatory framework to 
at least an EEC-wide regulation would help to exploit some of 
this potential as it creates right away a larger unified 
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market. As a result a number of marginal applications will 
come into the realm of profitability, allowing further 
experimentation with technology and demand. 
For this reason the issue of the unified European market in 
telecommunications equipment must not be seen as a threat but 
rather as a potential. The potential lies not only in 
increasing the available market area and therefore making 
certain applications profitable, whichotherwise; would have 
to be fore9one, but it also stimulates the competitive 
pressure at each of the different levels of equipment 
production and utilization. Increased competition means 
painful restructuring for some, but it also means lower 
prices and an increased application potential for others with 
important demand expanding effects. Furthermore, .since 
telecommunications equipment is to a large extent an 
intermediate input, these competitive effects will be felt 
throughout the Community by creating a larger and wider 
activity of application. "The relevant geographic markets" 
would be extended so that regionally or nationally 
concentrated markets may become more competitive within a 
more international framework. The benfits of this are 
obvious. It seems therefore worthwhile to take on some of the 
current restructuring costs which are necessary to get there 
not only for component and product suppliers but also for the 
network providers and their staff. 
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A Scenario for the Completion of the European Market, 
Using the Dixit and Norman Model 
Here we examine the quantitative consequences of a series of 
assumptions, which are fair characteristics of European telecom-
munications markets, when the individual national markets are 
extended by the removal of barriers to trade between member 
countries. We restrict our analysis to telecommunications 
equipment and VAS. We exclude the PSTN, because there is 
typically only one supplier per nation in the PSTN market and 
we do not envisage a further reduction in suppliers would be 
politically feasible. Consequently any efficiency gains in 
the PSTN from completion of the European market may be of a 
different nature than that observed in the other two markets. 
The production of customer premises, central office and 
transmission equipment and VAS may all be represented, as a 
first approximation, as taking place under conditions of 
constant marginal costs but where fixed costs must also be 
incurred. These fixed costs include factory overheads, research 
cind development expenditures and certification outlays. The 
ratio of fixed to variable costs determines the extent of 
economies of scale in production. They are least in CPE and 
most in central office equipment, but for each product depend 
upon the technique of production employed. Each European 
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market has a number of telecommunications firms (n) each 
producing an output (x) which we choose to measure in units 
per head of population or household. Following Dixit and 
Norman (1980) (as we do in the whole model), we make this 
choice because completion of the European market means increasing 
the number of potential customers (population) which national 
telecom firms may be able to serve. (We ignore for the moment, 
that these customers may want the products as means rather 
than ends). 
Entry into national telecom markets is assumed to be free 
enough for excess profits to be bid away. Each firm is supposed 
to choose output so as to maximise profits, taking the outputs 
of competitor firms as fixed. In order to keep the model as 
simple as possible, consumers are imagined to demand the 
products of the telecommunications industry so as to maximise 
a preference function into which the consumption of telecoms 
(c) and non-telecom products (c0 ) enter separably (the marginal 
utility from telecoms is not affected by the level of consumption 
of non-telecoms) • 
The functional form of preferences is:-
u = g(c) + c0 
These preferences are maximised subject to a budget constraint 
in which units are defined so that non-telecom products have 
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a unit price and consumption of such goods are the negative 
of the cost of telecoms production. That is, we ignore income 
per head (Y) from all other sources except profits from the 
telecom industry, on the grounds that only such profits are 
affected by the problem under analysis. 
y = pc + c 0 
where pis the price of telecoms. The cost of telecoms 
production per head of population is expendj ture on telecoms 
(pc) minus profits on telecoms (y), that is 
pc- y = -cb . Hence the lower are telecoms production costs, 
the greater is the well-being of consumers 
(U = g( c)- (pc- y) so when pc- y falls, U rises). 
Market equilibrium yields the following relationship between 
increase in market size (measured by population) and expansion 
of number of firms in the market: 
dn/n= (n-E+Z)/(2n-E+Z-1) ·[dH/H] 
where E is the inverse price elasticity of telecoms market 
demand, 
Z is the elasticity of E with respect to consu:::-r:-tior, of telecoms, 
i.e. Z=E' · [c/E], 
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dH is the proportionate expansion of population with market 
H 
extension 
dn is the proportionate growth in the number of firms 
n 
The growth in consumption of telecoms per head depends not 
only upon the number of supplying firms in the market but 
also on their outputs per head: 
c = nx 
dele = dn/n + dx/x = [1/(n-E+Z)) · [dn/n) 
With these two equations we can ascertain the approximate 
gains from opening up the Western European telecommunications 
equipment market. We can employ the model to gain an idea of 
the impact on users, i.e. telecoms and end users of services 
of completion of the European market by assuming that the 
national markets of the UK, France, Italy 1 Germany and Spain 
are all of roughly equal sizes and constitute the whole of 
the European Community market. 1 Then from the viewpoint of 
the firms in any one of these countries 1 European integration 
increases the market size by a factor of five (dH/H = 5). As 
a first example we assume each country has ten telecom equipment 
1 For simplicity's sake, we have not added a 6th or 7th 
fictitious country to resemble the population of all EEC 
member countries . 
- 63 -
-A.S-· 
suppliers (n = 10) and the price elasticity of demand (pe) is 
0.5. Hence the inverse price elasticity E = 2. If we assume 
a constant elasticity E, then Z = 0. With these numbers, the 
number of firms in the new 'average' national market (dn/n) 
increase by 2.35, that is from 10 to 33.5. But previously 
there were a total of 50 firms in the aggregate of the five 
markets. The number of telecom suppliers in the European 
Community falls consequently by about one third. Each of 
these suppliers now produces a smaller output per head (of 
the total market) but the number of heads in the market has 
greatly increased, with the consequence that the total output 
of each- firm has increased and economies of scale have been 
utilized to a greater extent. dx, the proportionate change 
X 
in output per head of each telecom firms is (7/8) 2.35 and 
dele, the proportionate increase in telecom consumption, is 
(1/8) 2.35 N 0.3 or 30%. 
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Table A.l 
Results of Simulation of enlarged market size on extra 
consumption and number of firms 
Changes in Consumption Changes in number of firms 
dele by factor: dnln by factor: 
3 5 10 n 3 5 10 
1.67 .71 .3 1.67 2.15 2.35 
1.25 .62 .28 2.5 2.5 2.5 
1.11 .48 .27 2.78 2.65 2.57 
The proportionate gain in consumption as a consequence of 
greater specialisation is greater the smaller the number of 
firms in the closed national markets, and (although it is not 
shown here) the greate~ the expansion of the market. Thus 
small countries, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, gain 
more from market integration if they start out with the same 
number of identical firms. The initial number of firms in 
the market may be taken as the channels by which scale economies 
impinge upon the industry. Sectors such as CPE with smaller 
scale economies will, for a given demand, be able to support 
more firms. In such sectors the consumption gains from integra-
tion will be le-ss than for central office equipment, where 
economy of scale effects are thought to be large. 
A more realistic and detailed assessment of the effects of 
completion of the European market involves choosing parameters 
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that take into consideration some of the simplifications of 
the model. In the current model all firms have similar cost 
functions and supply similar products, so that each produces 
a similar sized output. European telecom markets in fact are 
characterised by skewed size distribution of firms, which may 
be accounted for by product differentiation or buyers' interests 
in dual sourcing to ensure security of supply. In choosing 
the appropriate values of 'n' for our scenarios we therefore 
correct the actual firm size distribution to obtain something 
closer to the 'numbers equivalent' concentration measure. We 
compute the size of the main national markets and estimate 
the n~er of equal size firms that might survive, given the 
cost advantages of scale in those markets in Table 8.7. 
The average numbers we propose are:-
n = 2 for central office equipment 
= 3 for PABX 
= 4 for telephone handsets 
= 20 for VAS 
Given that there are around 200 VAS suppliers in the UK market 
the VAS figure may seem the most inappropriate. However by 
far the majority of VAS firms are small, supplying niche 
products whic'h we believe to be rr=i:r:J y location specific or 
software for the videotex market, v:~~.::.ch has different scale 
parameters than the rest of the VAS market. Our figure of 20 
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covers therefore only larger enterprises which are likely to 
export VAS to the rest of the Western European market, given 
a chance. We also assume that those countries which at the 
time of writing have not established a regulatory framework 
that allows a national VAS market to flourish, will have done 
so by the time the integration of the European market is 
completed. 
The telephone handset figure raises the question of the extra-
European trade regime assumed in the scenario. In a world 
free trade regime, telephone handsets are likely to be imported 
from outside Europe, probably largely by established telecoms 
suppliers, as has happened in the UK2 • Under this regime certain 
telecom products may continue to find export markets or even 
increase their foreign sales. That possibility allows for a 
greater number of firms and lower costs ~hrough enhanced 
utilisation of scale economies. An alternative plausible 
foreign trade regime is one of 'Fortress Europe' where imports 
are restricted by controls, tariffs, cert i..fication rules, 
standards or voluntary export restraint. In effect the CPE 
regime in most EC countries is like this at present since 
foreign suppliers must in effect have a domestic subsidiary 
if they are to be permitted market entry. Such a regime would 
be consistent with our assumed n value for telephone handsets. 
2 See NITA 1985. 
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Moving to the P~X and central office equipment markets we 
have to acknowledge that the model, based upon differential 
calculus, is poorly adapted to the discontinuities that arise 
when n is small. The model may require fractions of a firm 
which obviously could not exist. The assumption that all 
profits are dissipated by competition then becomes impossible 
to fulfill, because even though there are supernormal profits 
there is no room for another firm to enter. With the magnitude 
of the market expansion envisaged in this scenario this problem 
is likely to be of little importance in the alternative world. 
Another crucial point is the fulfillment of the stability 
condition 
n - E + Z > 0 
As n becomes smaller with unchanged E and Z, the chances of 
the above condition being violated apparently increases. 
However suppose that the demand curve for telecoms is linear. 
Then E varies directly with c and consequently 
E'c/E = Z > 0 
so that even if-n = E , as when there are two firms and the 
price elasticity of demand (pe) is 1/2, the stability condition 
is fulfilled. Those markets with a small number of suppliers, 
in ~·c~ticular central office equipment, also seem likely to 
have price inelastic demands, on the derived demand principle. 
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Central offices are inputs into telecom services but account 
for a relatively small proportion of the costs. As an approxima-
tion, the price elasticity of demand for inputs is the product 
of the share in costs and the price elasticity of demand for 
the final output, telecom services. Since both terms are 
fairly small, so also will be the input demand price elasticity. 
The logic of the stability condition can be seen most clearly 
in a monopoly industry; n=l where Z=O. Then if the price 
elasticity of demand (pe) is less than 1 (E > 1) a profit 
maximising monopolist will be unable to choose any output. 
Innovation in the telecoms industry, linked with the convergence 
with computing technology, is likely to provide an offsetting 
influence to the low elasticity of demand that has been inferred 
from the historical record. New services, once they become 
accepted, will face price elastic consumer demands and ~herefore 
the equipment which is necessary to take advantage of these 
services, will face more price elastic demands than formerly. 
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Table A. 2 
Results of simdation of eru<u-ged ma~ket size 
Proportionate change in num lter Proportionate change in 
of firms with market expansion by 5. telecom consumption 
dn/n dele 
co ~ Telephones ~ co ~ Telephones VAS 
pe\n 2 3 4 20 2 3 4 20 
(pe= .53) 
E=1.9 .45 1.77 2.06 2.44 4.5 1.609 .98 .134 
(pe= 1) 
E=1.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 ""<; .... 1.25 .833 .131 
(pe= 1.5) 
E=.666 2.86 2.69 2.63 2.52 2.143 1.152 .788 .130 
Given these numbers, the big consumption gains occur in those 
sectors where the number of firms is small for there the degree 
of monopoly is high. By contrast in VAS assuming a low price 
elasticity of demand just above 1/2, the number of 'firms' falls 
from 100 to 68.9 but the increase in co~sumption is little more 
than 13%. When interpreting these results, the assumptions 
underlying these numbers must be kept in mind. 
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Dixit and Norman's Model of Scale Economies 
and Imperfect Competition 
c 0 = consumption of all other goods per head 
c = consumption of telecom products per head 
Utilityfunction: U=g(c) +c0 (1) 
p =price of telecoms 1 y =lump sum income of consumers 
Consumer budget constraint: c 0 + pc = y ( 2) 
From ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) 1 
the inverse demand function: p = g' (c) ( 3) 
Xj =Production by firm j 
f + bXj =cost of production for firm j ( f and bare constants) 
xj =production per head of firm j 
H = number of heads in the market 
f + bHx j = f + bX j 
Total production per head in the industry: c =Ixk 
k 
Profits of firm j :71'; = H [g' (!xk)xj- bxj] - f 
k 
First order condition for a profit maximum: g' + xjg' ' - b = 0 
The inverse elasticity of market demand from ( 3): 
E = -cg' '(c)/g' (c) 
Hence the first order condition maybe written: 
g' (c) (l-Ex j I c) -b = 0 
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The second order condition for a profit maximum: 
2(c/xj) - E + Z- 1 > 0 
where Z = E'c/E, the elasticity of E with respect to c 
x= the value of production per head common to all firms 
(xj/c) = (x/c) = (1/n) 
where n is the number of active firms in the industry. 
A Cournot-Nash equilibrium holds for all firms in the industry. 
The first order condition can be written 
g' ( nx) [ 1 - E ( nx) /n] - b = 0 ( 4) 
The second order condition 
2n - E + z > 0 
A necessary condition for stability of this equilibrium is 
n-E+Z >0 
1T(n) =profits per firm per head 
Entry ceases when Tf(n) ~ 0 and 7T(n+l) < 0 
The number of active firms in the industry is determined by 
the integer part of IT( n) = g' ( nx) x - bx - f /H = 0 ( 5) 
Output per firm is determined by the first order condition (4) 
A larger market is equivalent to increasing H. 
Rearrange (5) to 
g'(nx) = b + (f/Hx) 
and differentiate logarithmically 
dn + Edx = f /Hx dx + dH 
n X b+f/Hx . X H 
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But (b + fiHx) = g'and fiHx = (g'-b), so using (4) and rearran-
ging: 
dnln + [1 - 1ln] dxlx = 1ln · dHIH ( 6 ) 
Differenciating (4) logarithmically 
-Ednln- Edxlx- ( Eln) I ( 1-Ein) · [ Zdnln + Zdxlx- dnln] = 0 
Cancelling and rearranging 
dxlx = ( 1- (n-E+Z)) I (n-E+Z) · dnln ( 7) 
Substituting from ( 7) for ( dxlx) in ( 6) yields: 
dnln = (n-E+Z) I ( 2n-E+Z-1) · dHIH > 0 ( 8) 
nx= c consumption per head. From ( 7 ) 
dnln + dxlx = [ 1+ ( 1- (n-E+Z)) I (n-E+Z)] dnln = 
=[ll(n-E+Z)]dnln 
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Appendix 2 Selected List of Mergers and Joint Ventures (1984-1987) 
A) Telecommunications Equipment 
1. Alcatel, the French equipment group, acquired the 
European activities of ITT 
2. Ericsson, the Swedish producers, won the take over of 
the French equipment group CGCT, together with MATRA 
3. In Italy the telecom manufacturers Italtel und Telettra 
attempted to form Telit, they collaborate together with 
9TE (now Siemens) in ITALCOM 
4. An agreement between GEC and Plessey to merge their 
telecom business in a 50:50 joint ·venture 
5. ITT~s sale of its stake in STC to Northern Telecom of 
Canada 
6. CGE, Siemens, Italtel and Plessey have cooperative links 
7. Philips has a joint venture with ATT for C.O. (5 ESS) 
and transmission 
8. Siemens has a joint venture (50:50) with GTE of the US 
(switching, transmission, R&D, manufacturing) that affects 
STE's European markets 
9. BT acquired the majority interest in Mite!, the Canadian 
PABX manufacturer 
10. Plessey acquired Stromberg-Carlson of the US 
11. NTT, NEC, Fujitsu, Hitachi and Oki collaborate on project 
060/70 
B) . Computers 
12. IBM bought Rolm, a leading US manufacturer of office 
communications systems 
13. In Britain STC purchased ICL, the computer maker 
14. Ericsson formed links with Honeywell, the US computer 
firm 
15. ATT and Olivetti link up. 
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Appendix 3 List of Firms and Institutions contacted during 
the Course of the Study 
Bundespost 
Philips 
Northern Telecom 
Federal Communication Commission 
OFTEL 
PTT Netherlands 
OECD 
Italtel 
ITU 
University of Lausanne 
Bell Communications Research 
Plessey Telecommunications & 
Office Systems LTD. 
Olivetti & C. SPA, 
AT&T Communications, U.S.A. 
Bundeskammer der Gewerblichen 
Wirtschaft, Wien 
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Final Report 
The Benefits of Completing the Internal Market for 
Telecommunication Services in the Community 
1. Industry Background 
1.1 Goals of European Integration in Telecommunication 
Services 
One of the objectives of the European Community in completing 
the internal market by 1992 is to eliminate all current 
barriers to trade. This_does not only apply to goods, but 
also to services (including telecommunication services), an 
issue specifically addressed in the EEC's Green Paper on the 
development of the Common Market for telecommunication 
services and equipment (COM (87) 290 Final). Its purpose is 
to initiate a wide-ranging discussion on those issues and to 
help in the establishment of a coherent Community-wide 
framework in the ongoing changes to the present system of 
telecommunications regulations. The aim of this study is to 
estimate the effects the Community policy will have on this 
development, both in sectoral and macroeconomic terms. This 
development will be compared against a status quo scenario, 
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as well as one of full network competition in long-distance 
services, as exempliefied by recent institutional changes in 
the u.s., Japan and the United Kingdom. 
1.2 The Product Telecommunication Services 
Telephone services are based on telephone networks, which 
link various parties through fixed (or mobile) networks 
electronically with each other, so that interactive exchange 
of information (voice, message, data, image) is possible. 
They are generally provided by public telecommunication 
organizations (PTOs), who exercise the monopoly for providing 
these s.ervices. Telephone services, which are derived from 
private telecommunication infrastructure (for example public 
utilities, such as rail, electricity etc.) cannot be sold to 
third parties. As a consequence, when we talk about 
telecommunication services we usually refer to those services 
provided by the national telephone administrations. Table 1.1 
. Summarizes the economic importance of these services in 
different Community countries. In 1986 the revenue from such 
services in the EEC was 62.5bn ECU (out of a "World" total of 
. . 
almost 300bn ECU). The four large member countries dominate 
. 
the service market, followed by Spain, the Netherlands and 
Belgium. Most of.the PTOs' revenue is from voice (85 - 95 
percent). The rest is accounted for by telex and data 
services, 1 as well as TV programme transmission. With the 
1 Telex revenue ranges from 5 to 6 percent of revenue in 
Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal, from 3 to 4 
percent for Germany and the U.K. Revenues from Data 
services are probably equivalent to this sum. See ITU 
Yearbook 1987. 
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introduction of ISDN, data and image transmission are 
expected to increase significantly. 
Table 1.1: National Income from Telecoms Service Provision 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Italy 3) 
(1985) 
Ireland 
Luxemburg 
Netherla~?s 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom2 ) 
Total 
Operating Income 
in mill. ECU 
1,405.45 
1,075.90 
13,428.15 
15,123.62 
72 0. 58 
8,351.00 
623.54 
82.07 
2,538.72 
678.90 
3,154.35 
14,244.99 
61,714.31 
in % 
of~ NP 
1.6 
1.7 
2.1 
2.0 
2.2 
3.8 
2.0 
3.4 
1.8 
3.2 
================================================================= 
1) CCT and CLT 2) BT only 
Source: Telefonica/ITU 
Exchange rates as of 1985 
3) SIP only 
The telephone services, as we know them today (Figure l.l), 
have not really changed that much over the first 90 - 100 
years of their life, that is until about 1960. Most of the 
service applications to which the telephone network was put 
consisted of simple voice transmission. The efficiency of 
providing this service has, of course, greatly improved over 
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time, as the network grew larger, using economies of scale 
and fill. The equipment and its handling was modernized with 
important technical developments in transmission and 
switching (brought maj_nly about by the introduction of 
microprocessors, computers and modern transmission tools, 
such as satellites and fibre optics) and with an associated 
fall in cost for the provision of telecommunication services. 
The lowering of cost and the increased potential to connect 
data processing and office equipment as well as mobile 
terminals to the telephone network has meant that new kinds 
of terminal attachments can be connected to the 
telecommunication network for information transmission 
(Figure, 1. 2). With the change over from analogue transmission 
techniques to digital signal transmission (where information 
is converted into binary codes of O's and l's), a number of 
these services can now be integrated, in other words, use the 
same network. This allows voice, data and images to be 
transmitted via the same telephone lines. 
Important applications can also be expected with respect to 
value added network services (VANS). These are mainly of the 
following types: 
message storage, processing and distribution, for 
example mailbox services, electronic mail and facs 
services· (for third parties), telex forwarding, etc.; 
- 91 -
-4a-
.,. 
F1gure 1.1: Trad1t1onal Telephone Network 
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code and protocol conversion between different data 
processing systems; 
information retrieval services, for example from 
videotex data bases (both private and public), 
commercial data bases; 
information processing services, for example through 
electronic data interchange, e.g. for electornic 
ordering and billing (for example in financial and 
tourist markets, but also for real goods between firms, 
suppliers and distributors etc.); 
safety and alarm services etc. 
The largest markets at the moment are information re~rieval, 
electronic mail and electronic data interexchange, including 
distributed data processing. 
With the broadening of telecommunication services its 
economic importance has grown despite the fall in real cost 
for each individual service activity. Telecommunication is 
therefore becoming a much more critical area for influencing 
the communication system within an economy, not only helping 
to link the various markets and activities better, but also 
to enlarge the geographic size, over which markets are now 
possible. As a consequence, its impact goes much beyond the 
national frontiers of an economy so that regulatory decisions 
- 93 -
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about by whom and how telecommunication services are being 
run must also be taken at higher international levels. The 
Community here has an important role to play. 
1.3 Trade in Telecommunication Services 
Trade in telecommunication services does not really take 
place in the way that international specialization normally 
2 
occurs, because the provision of telecommunications network 
infrastructures generally requires the physical presence of 
the network provider in the geographical area in question. 
The international telecommunications network infrastructure 
has traditionally been produced jointly by the national Tele-
communications Administrations, or Recognised Private 
Operating Agencies, of tne countries concerned. For 
connecting international traffic, neighboring carriers will 
forward (transit) traffic onward to its final destination and 
vice versa and are therefore reimbursed accordingly. The 
"trade balance" will be settled periodically, but since much 
of the traffic is in both directions, large imbalances that 
would give rise to a trade deficit or surplus are not the 
norm. In the case of bilateral telephone traffic the 
situation is similar to one of a bilateral monopoly with the 
relevant accounting and sharing rules negotiated accordingly. 
For traffic that may transit a number of countries or go via 
alternative routes, some elements of competition are intro-
duced since the possibility to play off one transit country 
2 i.e. via comparative advantage and specialization. 
94 -
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against another may lead to rate reductions. Furthermore, 
some countries have consciously lowered their international 
rates in order to attract extra transit revenue. This is, for 
example, the case on the transatlantic route where several 
telecommunication administrations own parallel transatlantic 
cables. The access to competing satellite networks creates a 
similar incentive, even though their services are by nature 
produced internationally. At this stage international 
organisations, like INTELSAT, but also EUTELSAT, Arab Sat 
etc., provide the international space segment and produce 
services jointly with the Telecommunications Administrations 
on a bilateral basis. They can form part of network 
infrastructures but can also be part of the provision of 
services. 
This tendency to attract transit traffic from other carriers 
or to improve the competitive position of their carrier and 
those segments of industry that are especially sensitive to 
·telecommunications cost (such as banking) has introduced some 
elements of competition which may lead to increasing 
"international" specialization in the future. This phenomenon 
has been increased with the policy of the u.s. administration 
to spread its domestic deregulation policy abroad. With the 
appearance of several additional international carriers such 
competition could further increase, especially if they are 
linked to competing national networks, as in the case of the 
U.S., the U.K. and Japan. As a consequence, increased 
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competition could change the rules of the game significantly 
so that eventually, purely administered production structures 
may be replaced by more economically determined ones. 
Trade does, of course take place on services transmitted via 
the telephone network or produced in direct conjunction with 
it, as in the case of VAS services. The attractiveness of 
telephone tariffs may, for example determine where the "host 
computers" for data banks are located, while "telebanking" 
may further those financial markets that have access to 
especially cost effective telecommunication services. 
With the increasing internationalization of the economies, 
the growing importance of tourism and international financial 
services, demand for international telecommunication services 
is increasing so that the telecommunication administrations 
see this as an important source of revenue. 3 Increasingly, 
domestic carriers will set up international companies in 
another carrier's territory, not only to assist its custo-
mers, but also to explore the potential for economic acti-
4 
vites in that country. 
3 In 1986, the revenue share from international calls ranged 
between 14 and 16 percent for Telefonica, DBP and PTT Denmark; 
it reached 19 percent for BT. 
4 Cable and Wireless, the parent company of the British 
carrier Mercury has bought a network in the u.s.; 
Ameritech, one of the seven large American regional 
carriers has bought the VAN carrier AirCall in the U.K.; 
Telefonica, the Spanish carrier is involved in acquisition of 
the Argentine PTO and failed, together with France Telecom, 
in a bid to acquire the Chilean PTO. 
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1.4 Barriers to Integration 
In the 1985 White Paper by the Commission (COM (85) 310) the 
costs of physical and technical frontiers are identified as 
basic obstacles to completing the internal market by 1992. 
The main advantage of reducing these frontier costs would be 
a greater integration of markets, in other words making them 
more competitive, while at the same time allowing increasing 
specialization and utilization of economies of scale. In 
telecommunication service provision economies of scale are 
already realized at a national level since except for the 
U.K., we have only one operator 5 and one physical network 
(for tpe moment ignoring the sizeable networks of public 
utilities and the military). Increased integration could 
therefore bring about only limited scale effects, unless one 
envisaged rather unrealistically the merger of a number of 
national telephone networks, given the strategic nature of 
telephone networks and the need for political control over 
such infrastructure being felt by national governments. But a 
harmonization of the different regulatory procedures may be 
possible and have important economic effects, as European 
governments are attempting to adjust their national 
regulatory structure to the effects of the "telematics revo-
lution". This harmonization can take a number of forms, for 
example concerning 
5 There are several operators in Italy, Denmark, France and 
Portugal, but their responsibilities are strictly 
delineated according to geographic and functional lines. 
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the regulatory structure, 
procurement of supplies, 
type of operation, 
tariff policy, 
standardization, 
utilization of the network, and 
access and connection to the network. 
Each of these variables effects a number of markets either on 
the input side (affecting the national base of telecoms 
equipment manufacturers) or on the output side (affecting the 
performance of individual sectors or the services available 
to individual customers). If the market for inputs is 
harmonized in such a way that a uniform European-wide market 
with competitive procurement practices results, sizeable 
savings as a consequence_ of product and production 
rationalization are possible 6 • The same applies to the market 
for customer premises equipment, where barriers to entry and 
restrictive certification practices sofar inhibit the full 
Community-wide market integration and the benefits that can 
be derived from such a policy. 
On the output side, performance can also be increased through 
more cost effective service provision, fewer restrictions on 
network utilization and the availability of additional, 
Community-wide standardized services. These effects may be 
due to 
6 See the INSEAD report on "The Benefits of Completing the 
Internal Market for Telecommunications Equipment in the 
Community", Fontainebleau, 1988, reproduced in EC ( 1988) 
Chapter 10. 
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(a) lower cost per given output and 
{b) better network utilization through more rational pricing. 
Concerning the first effect, our study shows that differences 
in operating practice may significantly affect productivity 
and the cost at which services are provided. Some 
administrations have had to pursue a restrictive investment 
policy so that there exists excess demand; manning levels had 
to be kept high in spite of large productivity advances in 
network services, because rationalization was politically not 
feasible. 
Concerning the second effect, we found that most PTOs have 
also kept long distance tariffs artificially high in order to 
cross-subsidize other services, and postal and parcel 
services. Such decisions not only raise tariff levels; but 
also influence tariff structures (i.e. the ratio of 
connection to call charges, the cost relation between local 
and ~eng-distance calls, between switched and fixed network 
services, etc), thereby further .distorting input decisions 
f~r teleocm users. The most important of these tariff 
structure effects is the cross-subsidization from long-
distance and leased line services to local telephone calls 
or, as mentioned above, from telecommunication to postal 
services.As a consequence, restrictions must be placed on the 
utilization of the network {especially for the use of leased 
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lines), so that service provision on the basis of the 
available network infrastructure, for example value added 
services, may be hampered. 
These points suggest that even so scale effcts for the 
provision of networks are fully realized, benefits from 
integration may still be large. The result would be larger 
service offerings, and an increased spectrum of network-based 
service offerings, thereby widening the arena of competition 
in VANS and CPE. VANS would benefit from a larger market in 
which to operate, thereby allowing a better spreading of the 
fixed costs associated with the setting up of these services; 
a larger market could also support many more specialized 
services. For CPE equipment, the same arguments apply, 
3. 
leading to ch~per "standardized" products but also a host of 
specialist products that could not be supported in isolated 
national markets. 
The arena of competition could be larger still if the current 
attempt to change the telecommunications regulatory structure 
tried at the same time to reduce the extent of the monopoly 
area necessary for infrastructure provision. Public Telephone 
Operators (PTO) could allow entry in the provision of CATV-
networks, in mobile services, in CPE equipment provision and 
maintenance, etc. 
This debate must not necessarily be seen in the regulation 
versus liberalization context alone. A number of 
adrninistrat:i.ons have shown that by sticking to commercial 
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principles and allowing maximum market influence, similar 
service developments might take place as in the case of 
competitive network provisions. On the other hand, 
competitive network pressure might help to reduce the 
dispersion in service efficiency currently observed. The 
reason for these differences relates on the one hand to 
different levels of operational efficiency, and on the other 
to goals with which telecommunication administrations are 
burdened such as 
preferential procurement policies, 
preferential training and hiring practices, 
P!eferential regional policies, 
cross subsidies to loss-making postal services. 
These policies all have the effect of raising production 
costs, thereby makin~ "the nervous system" of modern economic 
societies more costly and less effective. Furthermore, these 
policies tend to have an important influence on telephone 
tariffs. By making especially long distance communication 
unnecessarily expensive, the incentive to broaden the arena 
. . 
of competition and to integrate neighbouring areas into one 
market is hampered, reducing the potential effects of 
integration. 
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1.5 Recommendations of the Green Paper 
The recommendations of the Commission are set out in points 
A-J of the Green Paper (pp. 17-19) along with a set of lines 
of action and an acceleration of existing action lines such 
as the Community programs RACE and ESPIRIT (EC, 1987, p. 
20ff). The aim of the Green Paper is to bring about a more 
coherent framework in the ongoing regulatory change, to 
encourage the development of new services in a more 
competitive framework and to establish (and utilize 
politically, for example in international trade negotiations) 
a wider European Market for telecommunication services. In 
this sense, the recommendations suggest a coordinated 
widening of the competitive arena, while the acceleration of 
existing action lines is intended to speed up and to support 
this process. 
Within this overall framework telecommunications 
administrations are ·permitted to maintain their monooolv rolP in the 
supply of infrastructure except for those countries (i.e. the 
U.K.), which choose to opt for a competitive infrastructure 
provision (Proposition A of the Green Paper). 
Established suppliers can maintain the monopoly for a 
narrowly defined set of services (mainly voice telephony as a 
"reserved service"); they may compete with suppliers of new 
"non-reserved" services such as videotex, VANs, etc.) 
(Propositions Band C). 
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To harmonize the service offerings across Europe, a certain 
number of standardized services should be made available by 
each administration (Proposition D). 
Access to the network as far as new services is concerned 
should be on the basis of non-discriminatory terms in the 
form of open network provision (Proposition E). 
Access to the network via CPE equipment should be free and 
unrestricted, subject only to minimal type approval 
regulation. -Access to the satellite network via receive-only 
earth stations (ROES) should be of the same type (Proposition 
F) • 
Conflicts of interest in the regulatory framework should be 
eliminated by separating regulatory and operational 
activities of telecommunication admin1strations (Proposition 
G). 
Conflict-of-interest issues that might lead to predatory 
pricing and cross-subsidization between competitive and non-
competitive services should also be avoided by applying fully 
Articles 85, 86 and 90 of the EEC Treaty (Propositions H and 
I) • 
Inclusion of telecommunication activities under the 
Community's commercial policy should lead to a consistent 
Community position for international trade negotiations, for 
example as related to GATT, ITU, WATC etc. (Proposition J). 
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2. Scenarios to Analyze the Likely Effects of a Unified 
European Telecommunications Service Market 
2.1 A Status Quo Scenario 
In order to have a reference point against which to analyze 
the effects of the completion of the internal market, a 
status quo scenario as an "antimonde" is necessary. The basis 
of this is to assume that the recommendations of the Green 
Paper had not been made, but other developments would still 
take place, eventhough the two effects are difficult to 
separate in reality. 
In the course of our study we have noted the high degree of 
service integration already achieved between the national 
telecommunication operators, for example through the 
Conference of European Post and Telecommunication 
Administrations (CEPT) and its Coordination Committee on 
Harmonization (CCH), and the activities of the ITU and its 
International Telephone and Telegraph Consultive Committee 
(CCITT). Standards for new services and intercor.nection 
continue to be harmonized as, for example, in the case of 
videotex, teletex and facsimile services. Joint interfaces 
developed in that context allow the creation of private 
telecommunication services on the basis of public networks 
(via leased lines). In addition, some competitive effects are 
already being felt on the international side, so that the 
high price/cost margins on international calls are likely to 
be reduced further. 
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On the input side production continues to be rationalized due 
to the current industrial restructuring. The trend of regu-
latory reform in the individual countries will also continue 
though in a much less harmonized manner than that evisaged by 
an acceptance of the recommendations of the EEC's Green 
Paper. It is against this status quo scenario, in essence the 
"anti-monde" that the effects of the Green Paper must be 
compared. 
2.2 A Scenario in Accordance with 
the Community's Green Paper 
In ord~r to assess the policy effects that would arise out of 
an implementation of the recent Green Paper's recommendation 
it is necessary to analyze these proposals in detail and to assume 
that the Council of Ministers or the Commission will act on these to 
come into effect before 1992. When comparing the status quo 
scenario with the recommendations of the Green Paper we 
notice that the EC goes further in its recommendations 
concerning: 
the provision of competitive "non-reserved" services by 
private firms (Proposition C), 
open network provision on the basis of non-
discriminatory terms (Proposition E), and 
a more liberalized market for CPE (including receive-
only satellite earth stations (ROES) in combination with 
more Community-wide standard setting) (Proposition F). 
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Important are also the insistence on stronger anti-trust 
rules (Propositions H and I) and the recommended separation 
of regulation from operation (Proposition G) which should 
give important support to those competitive activities that 
are permitted to take place in competition with the PTOs. 
2. 3 A Scenario of Full Networ~< Competition 
The preceding discussion about the status quo scenario might 
make a scenario of network competition in long-distance 
services highly unlikely in the Community. However, it must 
be noted that the very large U.K. market is already 
characterized by limited network competition. The U.K. may 
have additional network operators by 1992 after the 
transition period for Mercury runs out. France, too, which 
represents almost a quarter of the EC's te.lecommunication 
administrations' revenue, may move in this direction. This 
together with increased international competition might be 
enough to suggest a third scenario of full network 
competition.6a Even if it is relatively unrealistic, it also 
represents a useful reference point against which to compare 
the scenario based on the current Green Paper. 
The underlying features of this scenario are very similar to 
the one observed in the U.K. or Japan: 
6a Full network competition actually refers only to the ype 
of intercity network competition currently observed in the 
USA, the U~., Canada and Japan, in which the local locp 
monopoly is usually maintained under some regulatory 
framework. 
- 106 -
-19-
limited entry of other network providers, 
"fair" interconnection of new entrants into the local 
loop and international networks. Where cream-skimming 
has to be avoided for political reasons, an adequate 
access charge is levied to ensure the sustainability of 
existing operators where they are technically more 
efficient; 
permission of resale and shared use of leased lines to 
prevent predatory behavior on leased lines by 
telecommunication administrations, when they compete 
with other network carriers; 
of course, Propositions E, F, G, H, I and J of the Green 
Paper apply without modification. 
3. Estimating the Costs of Non-Europe 
3.1 Identifying the Effects of the different Policies 
W~ are mainly concerned about the economic effects of these 
alternative scenarios, and therefore attempt first to analyze 
those effects which directly reduce telecommunication costs, 
then investigate the effects on changes in service 
offerings and finally the consequences of more rational anc 
less restrictive tariff policies on the economy as a whole. 
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Concerning the first effect mentioned above, 
there are several (direct) cost reducing effects that might 
be identified as a result of completing the internal market. 
The first effect refers to the benefits of joint, open pro-
curement. They have been identified in two separate exper-
tises for the Commission. 7 Depending on the divergence of 
current domestic market prices from competitive market 
prices, tariff levels could be reduced between 2 to 8 percent 
as a result of more competitive purchasing. 
The second direct effect is related to differences in opera-
tional efficiency. We have attempted to estimate these ef-
fects by comparing productivity between different telecommu-
nication administrations and with an analysis of total factor 
productivity for different administrations over time. 
The third direct effect relates to the results of a more 
rational tariff policy, when the recommendations of the Green 
Paper to move tariffs closer to cost, take place. These 
effects will be larger with the introduction of network 
competition, as the current political opposition to tariff 
rebalancing is overtaken by more direct economic pressure. 
While this is difficult to analyze sytematically without a 
consistent econometric model, some insights were gained by 
looking at existing price cost margins and demand 
elasticities for different services in order to gauge the 
likely consequences of such a "rebalancing" of tariffs, i.e. 
when the charges for rentals at local calls are raised and 
those for long distance lowered. 
7 See the studies by WS/ATKINS and INSEAD in EC (1988) 
Chapters 3 and 10, part 1 respectively. 
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The fourth direct effect relates to CPE equipment, as a 
consequence of a more liberal certification policy in a 
larger, unified market. 
The other effects are more indirect in nature, but may be 
equally important, since they concern the range of service 
offerings. This is not only the case with respect to CPE, 
where a large product variety is expected, but especially 
with respect to VANS. Both aspects are directly related to 
the "narrowness" of the remaining monopoly area and an 
effective interface between the regulated "reserved" and the 
"non-reserved" competitive area. We also investigate the 
effects of improved regulatory structure and increased 
standardization. 
3.2 Productivity Comparisons 
3.2.1 A Production Function Approach 
We start by analyzing productivity differences between PTOs. 
The aim of such a productivity comparison is to see whether 
one-telecommunication administration, say the Spanish one, 
could produce the same output in the U.K. as BT actually does 
but using fewer resources. Such a comparison relates to 
bundles of national outputs to their corresponding national 
input indices.or alternatively compares pairs of output with 
input ratios. Scale effects must also be considered. If they 
are important, an administration with a small territory may 
be more efficient, but operate at a lower scale level. 
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Differences in what is called X-inefficiency may also affect 
productivity. X-inefficiency refers to those unexploited 
efficiency gains which an organization could make by moving 
to its production possibility frontier (Leibenstein, 1966). 
We assume that a production function underlies the provision 
of telecommunication services and that the relation between 
inputs and outputs is determined by a given "production 
technology". A production function defines the quantities of 
output that an organisation or industry can produce with 
given management, organisation and t echnology, from given 
quantities of input. This relationship is often described, by 
economists at least, as an engineering one, a function which 
summarises the engineering data about how the available 
technology can be embodied in different techniques for 
producing a set of outputs from a set of inputs. Although 
this may be fair enough at a highly disaggregated level, 
where plants and firms are concerned, management and 
organisation must also be taken- as given and these are 
clearly not matters of engineering; they concern interactions 
between poeple. These interactions give rise to transactions 
costs, usually subdivided into the costs of information and 
of opportunism, which may well increase with the size of an 
organisation, while production costs may fall. 
To analyse the relation between input and output, variables 
must be specified in the appropriate form (in flow terms, 
multidimensional etc.). 
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The general form of the production function is: 
where Qi are the outputs, Ii inputs and t the "production 
technologyrr index. If one telecommunication administration 
produces the same outputs (local and national calls, private 
lines, data services etc.) from the same quantity of inputs 
as another telecom organization, but produced more value 
added services, then the first system is more efficient. It 
has a higher value for the "production technology" index. 
A problem of interpretation highlighted by the production 
function approach stems from the difference between the short 
run, when some factor inputs are fixed, and the long run, 
when all inputs may be varied. Telecoms investment has to be 
undertaken ahead of demand; the capacity must be in place 
before a service is extended. Just before the service is 
taken up, productivity will appear low because the capacity 
has not beeL fully utilised. The organisation is on its short 
run production function from which it shifts as the service 
is taken up. The cyclical pattern observable in a 
productivity index may be a consequence of this movement 
along short run functions. International comparisons of total 
factor productivity may therefore be misleading insofar as 
they compare organisations at different points on their short 
run production functions. The spread of domestic service to 
the virtual saturation level is a case in point. As more 
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households are connected to the network the infrastructure 
comes to be more fully used and productivity appears to 
increase rapidly. 
The effects of externally imposed constraints, for example 
concerning procurement or employment rules, must also be 
taken into account. They may prevent an organization from 
achieving the same degree of operational efficiency as an 
organization which does not operate under this constraint. 
The aim of the exercise is therefore not only to identify the 
best practice possible and the deviations currently existing 
from it, but also to see how the effect of an internal market 
would help to reach such a best-practice level. Such an 
approach requires decisions about what is to be considered as 
a constraint and what is not. It is for this reason that we 
also want to analyze the effects of full network 
liberalization to identify the sources of productivity 
differences and to what extent they may act as a major 
constraint of telecommunication policy. 
3.2.2 Simple Productivity Comparisons 
Productivity comparisons are difficult to carry out because 
the inputs, outputs and the production structures differ 
across administrations even for such a homogeneous product as 
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telecommunication services. Simple (partial) measures of 
productivity such as mainlines or revenue per employee (Tab. 
3.1) are only a first step, since they ignore differences in 
the degree of vertical integration. A PTO may install and 
maintain telephones with its own staff, as most 
administrations do, or subcontract this service out to 
private companies, as in the case of SIP. A PTO may or may 
not operate CATV networks; it may produce value added 
services together with its other activities or have a 
separate subsidiary for this purpose (Fig. 3.4). 
Keeping these caveats in mind, Table 3.1 indicates 
significant differences in productivity between those 
administrations for which such data were available. The 
Netherlands, Italy and Denmark come out on top, with the 
U.K., Norway and Belgium on the bottom. Some institutional 
knowledge can help to ident1fy some of the sources of 
productivity (for example the high value for SIP/Italy and 
Telefonica/Spain may be explained by the fact that both 
administrations contract a f~ir share of their activities out 
to private companies), but a more detailed analysis is needed 
to make more meaningful comparisons possible. 
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Table 3.1: Main line per Full-time Telecommunication Staff 
1974 % 1981 % 1986 1974/86 
Denmark 109 (32.0> 144 (3.5) 149 36.6% 
France 52 026. 9) 118 (27.1) 150 188.5% 
Germany CWestJ 64 (70.3) 109 (39.4) 152 137.5% 
Italy 93 <43.0) 133 (70.7) 227 144.1% 
Norway 56 <25.1) 70 (28.6) 90 60.1% 
Spain 67 (61.1) 108 (43.5) 155 131.0% 
United Kingdom 50 (50.0) 75 (23.3) 94 88.0% 
{ )= change Source: JTU, 1986 
Figure 3 .4. : Range of Work Undertaken by PTOs 
XX = only by administration; X = partly by administration; 
Installation Maintenance Exs:hange External Plant 
Country Mamlf act ure R&D 
Busi- Res~- Busi- Resi- Main- Construe- Main- Construe-
ness de nee ness de nee tenance tion tenance tion 
Belgium X X X X XX X 
Denmark X X X X XX X XX X X 
France X XX X X XX XX X X X 
FR Germany X X X X XX X XX X X 
Italy (SIP) XX XX XX XX XX 
Netherlands X X X X X X 
Norway X XX X XX XX X XX 
Spain XX XX XX XX XX X X X X XX 
UK (British 
Telecom) X X X X XX X XX X X X 
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3.2.3 Total Factor Productivity Analysis 
To account for these differences, the most important inputs 
and outputs variables must be combined into a total factor 
productivity index based on weighted input and output variables. 
In Appendix 1 the precise input and output definition used 
are discussed as are other measurement problems that arise 
1n this connection. Here it is sufficient to indicate that 
we use weighted input and output measures, using a Tornqvist 
index that gives us a series of binary comparisons between 
countries. 
This ii based on a fairly general functional form for the 
production function in the form of the translog function. 8 
Corresponding to this production function is the T8r~qvist 
total factor productivity index which has the form: 
k=n Qki (Wki + Wkj)/2 
~ 
TFPij k=l Qkj 
l=m Xli (Uli + Ulj)/2 
IT 
1=1 Xlj 
where Qk is an index of kth output 
Xl is an index of the lth input 
Wk is the weight assigned to kth Q 
8 This results from a second order Taylor series approximation 
to the general form of production function. 
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Ul is the weight assigned to the lth X 
n is number of outputs 
m is number of inputs 
i is the reference PTO to which another PTO is compared, 
1n this case British Telecom 
j is another PTO. 
A telecom organization i with a higher total factor productivity 
index produces more output from g1ven inputs and is more 
efficient than the organizations with which it is being com-
pared. In this case, if the ratio derived is greater than 
one, BT is more efficient, if the ratio is less than one, 
the comparative PTO is more efficient. 
The weights in the Tornqvist index are conventionally the 
share of each output's revenue in total revenue and tt~ share 
of payments for each input as a proportion of total cost. 
The economic justification for these weights is not strong 
in the case of telecommunication services because certainly 
output markets and perhaps input markets are not particularly 
competitive. Moreover returns to scale are widely believed 
not to be constant (Fuss, /~_83). 
In this study attempts are only made to correct for these 
problems as they affect the output weights. Only if prices 
are equated to marginal costs are revenue weights appropriate 
for outputs. If they are not, then cost elasticity weights 
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should be used explicitly instead. When returns to scale 
are increasing, these weights sum to less than one, with 
the practical consequence that small telecom organizations 
will seem less productive than they really are relative to 
large organizations, when revenue weights are employed. Ob-
viously the opposite is true when there are diminishing returns 
to scale. The problem is that reliable cost elasticities 
for each product group are not publicly available. 
The comparisons in our TFP analysis are based on standardized 
input and output variables. Outputs are standardized in terms 
of local and long distance calls which means that all other 
outputs have to be converted to this measure; 9 inputs are 
standardized for an average worker, material and capital 
input are related as far as possible to a physical measure. 
The TFP approach helps to overcome the deficiencies which 
are normally involved in simple partial international produc-
tivity comparisons (for example on the basis of full-time 
telecommunication staff per mainline) that we have carried 
out above, or on those that use exchange rates or an index 
of purchasing power parity. 
Table 3.2 shows the results of this more complex exercise. 
As a standard of comparison we have used British Telecom, 
9 A major problem is the large differences in the size of 
the calling area, that make a comparison of local calls 
difficult. 
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setting its productivity level at 100. Norway was also included 
because of data considerations. This more comprehensive analysis 
changes the previous ranking obtained (Tab. 3.1) dramatically. 
At the same time, even when accounting for most inputs and 
outputs, significant productivity differences remain between 
the PTOs. They show that Norway and Denmark, which have much 
smaller networks than BT are definitely more productive. 
Oenmark, as we note, has four different telephone companies). 
Telefonica and SIP now seem to be less efficient than BT 
and the Bundespost, which are about at the same level. 
The results vary with the output measures used as the comparison 
between BT and the Bundespost shows. The Bundespost, the 
telecommunication administration most comparable in size 
with British Telecom performs better if short-haul calls 
are used as output weights but worse with long distance calls. 
The ambiguity arises because the pricing structure of output 
differs significantly between the two countries, as Table 
3.6 further on shows. 10 BT, in addition, has a larger number 
of international calls. There are also some problems with 
using only SIP for the Italian comparison, since SIP only 
supplies domestic calls. Italcable, the interna-
tiona! carrier could not be included in the analysis. 
One possible refinement is to consider the effect of econo-
10 The ratio of local to trunk call tariffs is .21/.56 in 
the U.K., .11/1.66 (or 1.00) in West Germany. 
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Table 3.2: International Productivity Comparisons 
Inputs: The Percentage Ratios of Inputs of National Telecom 
Carriers to Those of British Telecom 
Input Category: U, 
(1986) 
Manhours 100 
Units of labour 
equivalent 
material 100 
Square metres 
of land and 
buildings 100 
Vehicles 100 
Local network: 
number of access 
lines 100 
Trunk network: 
digital channel 
kms 100 
All input 
Germany 
(1985) 
94.3 
52.6 
135.1 
81.3 
122 
137 
Denmark 
(1985) 
7.8 
5.1 
21.1 
n.a. 
11.9 
6.6 
S . 3 pa~n 
(1986) 
26.1 
13.1 
90.0 
14.5 
44.5 
4.7 
Italy 3 
(1986) 
35.4 
31.5 
113.6 
60.2 
82.6 
10.5 
Norway 3 
(1986) 
7.3 
1.9 
14.8 
11. 5 
8.3 
2.8 
aggregated 100 98 7.9 24.7 42.6 5.1 
---------1---------------~------------------------------------------
TFP Index : 
a) Labor Productivity Only 
Output Measure 2 
Short haul 
equivalents 100 111 
Long haul 
equivalents 100 _86 
Number of 
calls 100 81 
b) Total Factor Productivity 
Short haul 
equivalents 
Long haul 
equivalents 
Number of 
calls 
100 
100 
100 
107 
83 
78 
122 
128 
153 
121 
127 
152 
88 96 130 
80 57 84 
n.a. 101 n.a. 
92 80 185 
84 47 119 
n.a. 84 n.a. 
1 The indices of the table are the results of the TFP formula pre-
sented earlier, so that the higher the index number the more pro-
ductive the organisation. 
2 Output measure consists of inland and international calls and other 
output. Inland calls are represented in each of the three d1fferent 
ways shown. The three measures (short haul, long haul, number of 
calls) are alternatives. 
3 Work on capital account has been excluded from the inputs of 
both systems. For further details, see Appendix 1 and Foreman-
Peck and Manning, 1988b. 
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m1es of scale, i.e. productivity differences due to network 
size. When assuming the effect of increasing returns to scale 
(assuming cost elasticities of .8, i.e. a proportional increase 
in inputs by a factor 0.8 doubles output) the productivity 
advantage is even larger for the smaller networks of Spain 
and Norway, but also helps to bring Spain and Italy in line 
with BT. 
The results of these cost elasticity weightings must, however, 
be taken with a pinch of salt. Our attempts to estimate econ-
omies of scale separately for Germany and the U.K. have not 
been conclusive. While we have not rejected the existence 
of economies of scale,there was no statistical significance 
to suggest constant returns to scale either. As a consequence, 
if one assumes moderate economies of scale with a cost ela-
11 
sticity of .8 , the smaller networks with a lower productivity 
than BT seem now (like Spain and Italy) to be equally effi-
cient when scale is adjusted for, while the star performers 
Denmark and Norway more than double their performance vis 
a vis BT and the Bundespost. Even 'if these results are only 
preliminary, they suggest that large PTOs seem to be much 
more subject to external constraints, such as industrial 
policy and employment considerations, leaving their overall 
performance record severely affected, as smaller ones. But 
11 an assumption consistent with the empirical literature. 
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the results are also surprising enough, that they warrant 
further, more detailed analysis, also in line with expected 
benefits as a result of further market integration. 
We have already mentioned the problems encountered in data 
collection. This suggests that he results of Table 3.2 should 
only be interpreted as approximate measures. 12 Nevertheless, 
the surprising result that the smaller telecommunication 
administrations seem to be the most efficient suggests that 
the fear of smallness of size foL competitive carriers must 
not be taken all that seriously. 
Summarizing our attempts so far, we noticed significant pro-
ductivity differences between the PTOs, even if inputs, out-
puts and the degree of vertical integration are more adequately 
accounted for. The adjustment for economies of scale enlarges 
these differences. The results suggest either significant 
productivity differences, perhaps due to differences in pro-
duction technology and the degree of X-inefficiency, as well 
as the presence of important outside constraints on the PTOs, 
tl.at prevent a movement to the least cost frontier. 
12 Obviously, further refinement on these measures is necessary, 
especially to account for differences in service measurement 
(i.e. local calling area differences), standard of service, 
waiting time for connections, national topography or social 
obligations. All the data and measurement concepts employed 
in computing Table 3.2 show room for improvement and therefore 
these results are obviously provisional. 
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Table 3.3: Rates of Growth of TFP for Selected Countries 
Canada France UK Germany USA 
YEAR ------------------------------------------------------------
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
NTC 2 All 
5.3 
7.1 
7.8 
2.2 
0.7 
3.5 
4.8 
b. 0 
3.9 
9.7 
8.4 
9 
13 
19 
20 
9 
4.6 12.6 
7.9 
2.5 
1 
3.8 
5.2 
6.5 
4.1 
4.4 
DGT 
6.7 
6.3 
6 
4.8 
8.5 
8 
4.2 
6 
6.3 
BT 
4.7 
2.5 
2.5 
1.3 
1.5 
4.8 
-0.1 
1.4 
1.5 
-2.0 
-1.5 
2.5 
5.3 
6.4 
1.2 
-5.4 
1.7 
DBP 
TFP1 3 TFP2 4 
0.1 
0.4 
-1.6 
1.7 
2.7 
5.9 
7.7 
11.4 
5.1 
1.9 
1.5 
0.0 
0.5 
2.0 
-0.4 
2.6 
0.1 
1.1 
0.5 
2.9 
3.6 
6.7 
8.4 
11.8 
5.9 
2.8 
2.2 
0.7 
1.2 
2.6 
0.2 
3.4 
2.9 
4.3 
3.3 
4.4 
3.8 
0.6 
1.1 
4.0 
4.3 
3.7 
2.8 
4.4 
3.6 
4.8 
4. 2 
3.4 
Notes: 1 Terrestrial Carriers; Alberta Government Tel.; Bell Canada; 
Source: 
British Columbia Tel. 
2 Non-terrestrial Carriers; Teleglobe; Telesat 
3 Usual Method 
4 Method DGT 
5 Bell Systm 
Canada: Denny et al. (1980); France: Daniele et a1. (1985); 
USA: Christiansen et a1. (~985). 
3.2.4 Productivity Development Over Time 
The next question we raised was: Do productivity differences 
over time exhibit the same pattern? Ve measured total factor 
productivity growth for those countries, where data was avail-
able (U.K., West Germany) and collected and interpreted avail-
able studies for other countries (U.S.A., Canada, France)· 
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The results in Table 3.3 show not only large differences 
in average productivity, but also very sharp year-to-year 
fluctuations. The variations between the years sometimes 
seem to coincide, but in most cases there are significant 
differences. The cause of these variations is due to different 
rates of movement of input and output indices within and 
among the countries~3The interesting point is that the German 
growth in total factor productivity (TFP) almost parallels 
the evolution in the U.K. from 1974 up to 1980. France seems 
to differ significantly from the other countries, with sub-
stantially higher productivity growth, at least since 198o. 13 a 
North American TFP growth historically seems to have been 
high relative to what is known about European telecommunica-
tions experience. 
Between 1947 and 1979 the US Bell system averaged TFP growth 
(Tornqvist index) of 3.2% p.a. _and an output growth of 7.4% p.a. 
13 A caveat is that in regulated or nationalised industries 
the assumptions underlying conventional TFP calculations 
are not necessarily strictly correct and at least the 
short run variations in the indices should be taken with 
a pinch of salt. 
13a on closer inspection we discovered that the French method 
of computing total factor productivity growth included 
an extra contribution to net operating capital, a factor 
that had not been included for the U.K. and West German 
calculations. When this measure was included in the analysis 
for West Germany, the average growth rate in TFP between 
1971 and 1985 rises from 2.6 percent to 3.6 percent and 
is then more or less in line with the average French growth 
rate during the same period. 
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Between 1965 and 1979, TFP growth was 3.5% p.a. and output 
grew at 8.4%. Over a similar period, an arithmetic index 
of UK TFP growth averaged less than 2% p.a. and output growth 
averaged 9% p.a. German productivity growth was a little 
higher (using a Tornqvist index) and so was output growth. 
Canadian TFP and output growth was the highest of the four 
systems. As mentioned above, TFP growth depends not only 
upon the optimum absorption of technical developments but 
also, if there are scale economies, upon the rate of growth 
of the system. However since the UK and the US systems grew 
at approximately the same rates, as a first approximation 
neither scale economies nor diseconomies can account for 
the apparent discrepancy in TFP growths. 
Econometric evidence suggests that scale economies diminish 
with system size, which should confer an advantage upon the smaller 
European systems as far as TFP growth is concerned. The 
Tornqvist (geometric) and the arithmetic indices used respectively 
for the American and the British, German and French TFP mea-
sures are not exactly comparable but differences are likely 
to emerge print i_pally in their variabilities rather than 
~n their trends. That the German TFP index was also below 
that of the US suggests the nature of nationalised industry 
regimes and/or the associated social obligations accounted 
for faster US TFP growth. As far as it is possible to tell, 
Bell inputs were not a major source of gain to the Bell system, 
for between 1958 and 1976 Western Electric's TFP growth averaged 
only 2% ~.a. 
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The productivity differences observed and the erratic movement 
between the years indicates that a number of additional fac-
tors may be responsible for this development in addition 
to those mentioned above. This relates not only to changes 
in the composition of output and input but also to the degree 
of network utilization (in essence a fixed capacity), which 
tends to vary with level of economic activity. We were not 
able to adjust the measurements with a specific capacity 
variable to correct for this influence, however. 
What do these measurements tell us about international produc-
tivity differences? They suggest that at least compared to 
the UK, the US and the Canadian environment seems to have 
supported a higher productivity growth rate. But network size and 
speed of expansion also p~ay a role. To analyze these two 
factors, we must recognize that productivity growth can be 
divided into two components: 
shifts of the production function as a consequence 
of superior production techniques (technical change), 
and 
better use -of inputs with increasing scale, which has 
a more than proportionate effect upon output growth 
(economies of scale) (see Figure 3.5). 
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If we compare the case of a network which has been subject 
to capital rationing or inefficient management, increasing 
capital availability and/or exposure to competition (i.e. 
with one of allowing other network operators to enter) the 
latter may exhibit a more mod~n~ production structure, thereby 
shifting the production function to a more efficient regime. 
On the other hand, even if the pace with which the production 
function shifts for some administrations may not be affected, 
total factor productivity growth may still be influenced 
when economies of scale in the telecommunication network 
are significant (better utilization of the scale effect). 
This latter effect may be particularly important where tariff 
levels are significantly reduced and rebalancing favors the 
more pLice elastic segments of demand. In this case exploiting 
the demand for telecommunication services should lead to 
network growth and a stronger utili3ation of economies of 
scale. 
Keeping this relationship in mind, we have analyzed the relation 
between total growth rates of the telecommunication network 
in the different countries and pr~ductivity growth (Table 
3.4). Productivity growth in the German network seems to 
have been faster than in the British system (2.6 percent 
p.a. compared to 1.65 to 2.llpercent, depending on whether 
the last observation is included). But the German output 
also grew faster than the British over much the same period 
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Table 3.4: International Telecom 'l'FP Growth Comparisons 
Input Telecom TFP 
%growth %output growth 
p.a. growth p.a. 
(X. ) ( Q.) (Q.-X.) 
United 6.64 8.75 2.11 
Kingdom (1.65) 
(1964-80) 
Germany 10.59 13.19 2.6 
(1970-85) 
Canada 5.3 8.74 3.44 
(1973-81) 
Figure 3.5: Changes in Telecom Costs as a Function of Scale 
and 'l'e~hnical Change 
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(13.19 percent p.a. for 1970- 1985 compared to 8.74 percent 
?.a. for 1965 to 1980), suggesting that the Bundespost also 
benefitted more from scale effects. 
For a comparison to be carried out along the lines suggested 
above, we need to know something more about the scale ela-
sticity so we can analyzethe two components of productivity 
growth in the form discussed above: If 
Q. 1s the rate of growth of telecom output, 
A. the rate of technical progress, 
X. the rate of growth of inputs and 
E the scale elasticity, 
we assume the following relationship holds approximately 
Q. = A. + EX •• 
If Germany and the UK had the same scale elasticities then 
the rate of technical progress or shift in the production 
function could be computed as: 
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h subscripts g and UK refer to A me A _ A = 0, w ere ssu ·g "UK 
Germany and UK respectively. 
Then E = (Q. -g Q.UK}/(X.g 
= Q.g - (Q.g Therefore A. 9 
_ x.UK} = 4.44/3.95 = 1.124. 
Q }/(X. - X. )X. = 1.287. 
"UK g UK g 
The shift in the production function implied by different 
scale elasticities may be computed given historical values 
of both Q. and X. 
Table 3.5 shows that the scale elasticity at which German 
Table 3.5: Relation between Scale and Technology Shifts 
Production function 
shift factor: 
Scale elasticity A. g A.UK 
1. 4 5 -2.16 -.87 
1. 30 .58 .12 
1.125 2.287 1. 287 
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and British technical progress would have been equal is 1.124, 
implying at the same time a yearly "technology shift" of 
1.287 percent. This shifts the production function 50 percent 
faster than the historical Canadian rate of .83 percent p.a. 
{Kiss, 1983, p. 93). It is unlikely that German and British 
technical progress was so much higher than Canadian. Instead, 
and keeping in mind the higher scale elasticity estimates 
for the US and Canada seems to suggest that the true scale 
elasticities are higher than 1.124, to reduce the estimated 
German and British coefficient of technical progress. Because 
if Germany and Britain had scale elasticities similar to 
thoseestimated for the Un~ted States and Canada, i.e. 1.3 
and 1.45, and also had the histor~cal rate of technical progress 
of Bell Canada (.83 percent p.a.), productiv~ty growth would 
have had to be roughly 25-50 percent higher than it actually was. 
We must loc,:for reasons why the outside constraints put on 
the British and German system may have been more significant 
h . h . . f d 13 b f k h. t an 1n t e s1tuat1on o Cana a. I one ta es t ~s inter-
pretation literally, then the higher productivity growth 
in the privately owned regulated· Canadian system that is 
characterized by relatively little short term policy interference 
suggests that a ~5-50 percent higher productivity effect 
13b One interpretation is the more politically determined 
regulation in W.Europe, which tends to make the fine 
tuning of investment, tariff and service conditions more 
difficult compared to the more technocratic, rate of return 
regulation observed in the USA and Canada. Another is that 
the incentive structure to minimize cost, however imperfect 
under the American system, may have been stronger than in 
the European public enterprises. 
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may be taken as the effect of liberalizing the German or 
British networks from these constraints. 
A major problem with drawing inferences from the above data 
is that the past cannot be an infallible guide to the future. 
Since 1976 there have been sufficiently radical changes in 
telecom equipment to warrant the description of a new tech-
nological trajectory. If anything the underlying rate of 
technical progress has increasec in the last ten years. Coupled 
with the organisational slack which international comparisons 
of TFP levels suggest, the 25-50 percent growth penalty of 
the German and British network environment may not be too 
far off. 
The importance of creating conditions under which the full 
effects of technical progress can be implemented in a telephone 
network should not be underestimated. This can be illustrated 
by analyzing the effects of a 1 percent higher productivity 
growth rate between 1988 and 2000 in Figure 3.5. With a 12.75 
percent higher productivity rate in 2000, 11.3 percent less 
inputs would be needed to produce the same output. Taking 
the price elasticity of telephone demand also into account 
enhances this effect. 
Assume for simplicity constant elasticity demand and unit 
cost functions and that network operators make normal profits 
so that economic costs are covered by revenues. Then it can 
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be shown that the elasticity of telecom output (Q) with respect 
to shifts in the cost function such as might be caused by 
a more consistent regulatory regime is illustrated by 
(ln C)- 1/(b+g) 
where b is the elasticity of unit costs with respect to output 
and g is the reciprocal of the absolute value of the price 
elasticity of demand for telecoms. 14 
If the price elasticity of d~mand for telecom services in 
aggregate is -0.6 and the unit cost elasticity is -0.2, the 
ultimate effects on telecom output of an 11.3% fall in costs 
is 7.7%, i.e. an increase from Q0 to Q1 in Figure 3.5 or 
the measure of (-11.3 x -1/(-0.2+(1/0.6))% = 7.7%. 
An alternative measure of the tariff rebalancing effect is 
.based upon the quantity elasticity - the shift in the demand 
function of Figure 3.5 measured horizontally instead of ver-
tically. In terms of the above notation we need 
14 i.e. ln c = ln a + b ln Q a unit cost function, with 
parameters a and b 
ln p = ln f - g ln Q a demand function, with 
parameters f and g 
ln p = ln c are the equilibrium condition. 
With economies of scale, b<O. Then 
ln Q ln f-ln a ln Q 1 the proportionate change = = 
- b+g = b+g ln a 
in telecom output Q in response to a proportionate change 
in the intercept of the unit cost function, a. 
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log Q/ ~ F = g/b+g. 
Thus if b = -0.2, g = 1.66 as above, the quantity elasticity 
is 1.137. A 20 percent expansion of traffic in a given system 
from tariff rebalancing could ultimately,with more investment 
to lower costs, increase traffic by 20 x 1.137 = 22.74 percent. 
Obviously with larger scale coefficients these effects will 
be larger. With a modest scale elasticity of 0.8 tariff re-
balancing lowers unit costs by 22.74 x 0.2 = 4.54 percent. 
Higher scale and price elasticities raise this number, lower 
ones reduce it. 15 Keeping the overall service revenue of 
6lbn ECU of 1985 in mind suggests that the resource savings 
due to hiqher ~roductivitv rates are substantial, as they 
are to the advantage of the traffic that would in any case 
have been generated, while the extra traffic generating effects 
would also result in resource savings (due to economies of 
network fill) and in extra service output. 
3.i Influence of the Tariff Structure 
3.~.1 Tariffs and Cream-Skimming 
The overall role- of telecommunication tariffs is: 
to provide means for obtaining efficient use of existing 
15 A doublina of the unit cost eleasticitv to -0.4 with the 
same price elasticity yields price reductions of 8.92 
percent. 
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capacity, for example through peak-load pricing, 
to give signals for new investment and 
to yield revenue on past investment and current operating 
expenses. 
Greater network efficiency is therefore not only achieved 
through lower cost per given output, but also through better 
utilization-as a consequence of a more rational pricing struc-
ture, since current telecommunication tariffs diverge signi-
ficantly from costs. Rentals (to have access to the network) 
and local calls are usually charged below their true economic 
costs; long distance and international calls are charged 
significantly above costs. As a consequence the price signals 
to the users of the telecommunications network are distorted, 
causing the users to make allocatively inefficient decisions. 
Over longer distances, he may make less use of telecommunica-
tion services than the true economic costs would suggest. 
Instead, he may use other communication means or, as a busi-
ness man, engage himself less in far away markets. This leads 
not only to an underutilization of the productive resource 
telecommunication, but also to a reduction of the potential 
h ' k . 16 h d. geograp 1c mar et s1ze. Over s orter 1stances, the telephone 
16 These indirect effects - a lessening of the potential 
competition - may be an important side effect that has 
so far been overlooked in this discussion. 
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gets used more, requiring a further capacity build up than 
would be required if the customer was facing the proper oppor-
tunity costs. 
To these allocative costs for the telephone user, and the 
dynamic cost of insufficient market expansion, one has to 
add the dynamic costs to potential service producers whose 
17 
entry is prohibited, because of the danger of cream-skimming 
through arbi~rage. While arbitrage may hurt an administration 
financially, its prohibition also prevents the innovative 
offerings of certain services, or the spreading of others, 
because ''shared use and resale" of such services, which could 
lead to arbitrage, is not permitted. Those enterprises which 
have developed certain telecom applications in-house or between 
their subsidiaries (or cooperating partners, for example 
in the case of airlines, banks, etc.) are allowed to sell 
these services to third parties only under certain restrictions 
and sometimes not at all. That implies not only a significant 
barrier ~o entry for VAN services based on the telephone 
network, but also discriminates against smaller users that 
cannot develop or utilize these services in-house because 
of their small scale. 
17 This refers to the incentive that any potential suppliers 
of telecoms services (either on the basis of leased lines 
or competitive physical networks) has to enter mainly 
in the lucrative long distance market, thereby "skimming" 
the cream needed to subsidize the deficit services - rentals 
and local calls. The fact that the tariffs between the 
different long distance services (i.e. dialled services, 
leased lines, data services, broad band transn•ission rates) 
differ significantly may still lead to cream~k1~ming because 
of the potential to arbitrage. 
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Only a "harmonization" of tariffs can reduce the arbitrage 
incentive, so that the current restrictions which are based 
on the use of leased lines (i.e. "no connection to the switched 
network, no use for third parties") can be removed. Tariffs 
may be harmonized on the basis of cost (implying a "rebalancing" 
i.e. a lowering of long-dtstance (and in some countries leased 
line) tariffs and a raising of local calls to reduce the 
losses occurring there) or in relation to the tariffs of 
a major service - like diall~_d·. voi~e. While this second option, 
brought ab9ut a volume-related tariff on leased lines, 18 
reduces the danger of arbitrage as well 1 it still leaves 
the allocative problem unresolved, because tariffs now diverge 
significantly more from costs than be ore. 
It is our opinion, that the competitive network scenario would 
lead more quickly to a rebalancing of tariffs or the basis of 
costs. While there is some discussion about principles of tariff 
policy in the Green Paper's Proposition E, they are still 
sufficiently vague make a prediction of the related consequences 
of the Green Paper ~i the moment impossible. The ~ompetitive 
network scenario can therefore be taken as an indication of 
ho1: far the Commission needs to go if simular effects are to 
be achieved by tariff principles. 
3.3.2 Allocative Costs of Tariff Distortions 
Tr identify the economic importance of tariff distortions it is 
necessary to obtain a rough estimate of the current cost of 
this policy, for example using the sum of the producers and 
consumers surplus as such an indicator. 
18 This is the ~ption which the Bundespost has chosen. 
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The producer surplus is measured by the difference between 
the price received (which is the same as the price paid by 
the consumer) and the minimum the producers would have accepted 
- marginal cost. (The consumer surplus is ~ow much buyers 
would have been willing to pay - i.e. the "demand price" 
- over and above the price actually paid. The difference 
between demand price and marginal costs is therefore a measure 
of the benefits foregone by a transaction which does not 
take place. In quantitative terms, the total net benefit 
from an exchange can be measured by the difference between 
the demand price, which is a point on the markets demand 
curve and the marginal cost curve. 
This measure indicates that if tariffs are less than marginal 
cost the net benefits from the transaction would be nega-
tive (i.e. producer surplus losses swamp gains in consumeL 
surplus), if the asking price is above marginal cost, some 
consumers may be excluded who would have bought at marginal 
cost. The welfare loss here occurs from losses in the consumer 
surplus that swamp any gains in producer surplus. As a corollary, 
of course, maximum economic efficiency is achieved with mar-
ginal cost pricing. 
This does not mean that tariffs should in all circumstances 
equal marginal cost - there are a number of reasons why sub-
stantial departures from this principle will be required 
in pricing telecommunication services. But it does mean that 
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that the structure of marginal costs provides the basic informa-
tion from which practical tariff structures will ultimately be 
derived and against which the allocative costs of distortions 
must be measured. 
A simpler alternative is to compare tariffs with costs and to 
assume that the losses and gains are proportional across countries. 
3.3.3 Current Tariff Structures in the Community 
What makes the analysis of tariff rates so difficult, even 
if it is limited to the major market, switched voice services, 
is th~t there are usually four different tariffs for such 
service, providing for a rather complicated tariff structure. 
These are tariffs: 
for installation of a telephone (connection char9es) 
for a monthly or bi-monthly rental, 
for local calls, and 
for trunk and international calls. 
The first two tariffs pay for the access to a particular 
. 
service, regardless of whether or not a subscriber in fact 
makes use of this service. Externality considerations may, 
especially in small networks, require pricing below cost, 
to encourage reaching a critical mass and may therefore vary 
with the growth of the service (Mitchell, 1978). 
- 138 -
-49-
We are now equipped to analyze the current European tariff 
structure in Table 3.6. We observe indeed a wide variation 
in tariffs that seem inconsistent with what is probably a 
much more uniform cost structure across countries (even in 
the absence of telecom services being traded). Connection 
charges range from a low of 31 and 36 ECU in Germany and 
France, where the use of second telephones has been encouraged 
in an essentially saturated network, to the cash-poor admini-
strations of Ireland, Italy and Greece, where the residents 
must pay most of the initial cost of a telephone connection 
in the connectwnfee. Actual connection costs are probably 
in the neighborhood of 250 to 400 ECU, showing that in all 
countries network externality effects (i.e. the benefits 
to existing subscribers if a new subscriber joins) are still 
taken into account. To·make more people join the network, 
new subscribers recieve their connection often signif1cantly 
below cost. 
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Table 3.6: Major Tariff Variables in the .EC {1987) 
in ECU 
(includes VA charges where applicable) 
Country Connections Monthly Rentals Local Call (LC) Call Area 
Housholds Business Tariffs Size 1l 
(3 min) 
Great Britain 150 9.00 14.02 0.21 221 
Italy 151 4.48 11.54 0.20 9 
Belgium 116 10.50 10.50 0.14 78 
Ireland 235 11.20 15.10 0.14 78 
Luxemburg 58 5.78 5.78 0.12 na 
France 36 5.67 13.82 0.11 120· 
West Germany 31 10.80 10.80 0.11 135 
Denmark 189 9.88 9.88 0.10 na 
Netherlands 97 9.81 9.81 0.06 5 
Portugal 66 7.98 7.98 0.05 1 
Greece 199 2.23 2.23 0.03 5. 
Spain 83 6.66 7.03 0.03 na 
Tariff for Trunk Calls 
(3-min.) Intern. Call Intern. Leased TC1 m. 
up to 100 Km max. Dist. Index (3 min)2l Lines3l LC LC 
(TCl) (TC2) 
Great Britain 0.56 0.56 0.57 1162 2.7 2.7 
Italy 1.62 1.72 0.94 3500 8.1 8.6 
Belgium 0.69 0.69 0.80 1625 4.9 4.9 
Ireland 1.26 1.26 0.88 1878 9.0 9.0 
Luxemburg 
-.-- -.-- 0.67 1702 -.-
France 0.85 1.59 0.65 1541 7.7 14.5 
West Germany 1.00 1.66 0.48 2352 9.1 15.1 
Denmark 0.36 0.36 0.41 1312 3.6 3.6 
Netherlands 0.26 0.26 0.41 1743 4.3 4.3 
Portugal 1.19 1.19 0.90 2889 23.8 23.8 
Greece 0.97 1.15 0.89 2582 32.3 38.3 
Spain 0.06 1.07 1.00 2481 20.0 35.6 
1) measured in average number of e,vbange lines in 1 000 • estimates 
2) refers to calls between Madrid and corresponding c:Ountry, i.e. calls from Denmark are 41 % of 
the tariff in the reverse direction tw tr tl · 
3) al d · cb . S & ... : ... ~. • • • d' d o ansa antic. rent an connection arge m ,or ~t pnvate arcwts to a ~acent country an 
IBM 1987, reproduced in Fmancial Times Business Information 
Source: Telefonica, Revista T, No 16, Oct. 1987; DIW, British Telecom 
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A tariff differentiation between business and households 
allows telephone authorities to take advantage of the higher 
demand elasticities of households for telephone rentals. 
This policy of price differentiation is only pursued seriously 
in four countries (U.K., Italy, Ireland and France). By charging 
the price inelastic and call intensive business sector with 
slightly higher rental charges provides the authority with 
an extra subsidy with which to increase telephone penetration 
in households or keep local calls lower. It also provides 
a way for keeping the deficit arising ~n connection with 
financing connection charges lower. 
Comparing rental rates with the actual deprec~ation costs 
fo the local loop (independent of installation costs) suggests 
that they are also being subsid~zed from call charges. Our 
interview evidence suggests that the marginal costs for maln-
taining and depreciating old established lines may be 6 to 
8 ECU per month per line, with 8 to 10 ECU in rural areas. 
The marginal costs for new lines is more in the neighborhood 
of 15 to 20 ECU, given todays very much higher wage costs. 
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The marginal costs of local (measured) calls are about .03 
to .04 ECU per minute, with the initial minute being somewhat 
higher. This suggests a marginal cost for a 3-minute call 
1n the neighborhood of .1 ECU or slightly above, depending 
on cost conditions and the size of the local calling area. 
Table 3.6 indicates important deviations below this figure 
for Spain, Greece, Portugal and the Netherlands, but also 
somewhat higher rates for the U.K. and Italy. Some of this 
difference may be explained by the wide variations in the 
size of the local calling area indicated in Table 3.6 with 
the average number of exchange lines. The U.K. data which 
has come under close scrutiny by OFTEL may actually be in 
line with U.K. cost, suggesting that our cost estimates may 
actually be on the low end. 
Most important in terms of a typical telephone bill; are 
charges for trunk calls (50-500 km), since they make up 50 
to 70 percent of the subscribers' telephone costs. Here our 
estimate suggests marginal costs per additional minute in 
the neighborhood of 0.1 ECU with the initial minute being 
about .03 - .05 ECU higher, sugg~sting a marginal cost for 
a ?-minute call of .3 to .4 ECU. Only the Netherlands and 
Denmark come close to this range (mainly because of the short 
trunk distance involved) with the U.K., Belgium and Spain 
.somewhat above. The big distortions arise in Italy, Ireland, 
West Germany, Portugal and Greece , especially over the longer 
distances. 
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Table 3.7: Elasticities of Demand for Telephone Calls 
Source 
Waverman (1974) 
Cracknell (1982) 
Waverman (1974) 
Waverman (1974) 
Country Service 
GB Inland trunk calls 
GB Inland local calls 
Inland trunk calls 
- peak & standard 
- cheap 
International 
- West Germany 
- USA standard 
cheap 
- New Zealand 
CDN Residential and 
business calls 
s Trunk calls 
Davis et al. (1973) USA Local 
Toll 
Littlechild & 
Rousseau (1975) 
Lago (1970) 
Naoe (1974) 
Private line 
WATS 
USA Business - 100 miles 
500 - 700 miles 
Residential - 100 miles 
500 - 700 miles 
All International calls 
J International calls 
Price 
Elasticity 
-0.630 
-0.095 
-0.123 
-0.101 
-0.156 
-0.408 
-0.842 
-0.484 
-1.200 
-0.290 
-0.210 
-0.880 
-0.740 
-0.140 
-0.100 
-0.200 
-0.200 
-0.300 
-1.250 
-2.280 
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It is here where much of the negative allocative effects and the 
large welfare losses as a result of the current tariff policy 
take place, because the elasticity for long distance calls is 
significantly higher than for local calls (see Table 3.7). In 
the case of international calls, where the deviation of prices 
from costs is much greater and the price elasticities are still 
higher (-0.8 to -1.5) welfare losses are even larger. 
3.3.4 Welfare Losses and Dynamic Effects of Current Tariff 
Structures 
There have been a number of studies to estimate the welfare 
gains from a move towards marginal cost pricing. Neumann 
et al. (1982), who have carried out such a study for Germany, 
concluded that a move from the(l979) German pricing structure 
to a rnargi~~l cost pricing structure would have reiulted 
in a welfare gain of almost 2bn DM, almost 10 percent 'of 
income from voice services. This figure is still valid today, 
as our more recent calculations (in the appendix) show. 
A more rational tariff policy implies not only significant 
g~ins in consumer surplus, but also an upward shift in the 
aggregate demand curve. By changing the structure of prices, 
the total demand for telecom services - at given average 
prices - is increased. Furthermore an adjustment of tariffs 
nearer to cost, for example by more than 50 percent in the 
case of trunk calls in West Germany, could lead to a 20 percent 
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increase in call volume. To raise the charges for local calls 
on the other hand causes a much less proportional traffic 
loss. The positive allocative benefits of such a move are 
clear. 
Furthermore, in the presence of system economies of scale 
(as shown in Figure 3.5) unit costs also decline with an 
expansion in demand, thereby confering benefit on existing 
traffic (at least in terms of resources saved) as well as 
stimulating overall demand further. Using similar demand 
and cost parameters as before, a 20 percent expansion of 
traffic as a consequence of rebalancing could ultimately 
- with more investment and lower cost, increase traffic by 
22.7 percent, while at the same time lowering unit costs 
19 by 4.5 percent. 
None of the studies which we have surveyed cover the dynamic 
effects of the current tariff policies that we have mentioned 
above. Furthermore, these studies do not tend to show the 
impact of current tariff restrictions on user and producer 
freedom that are necessary to avoid the tendency towards 
arbitrage and cream-skimming as a consequence of a more liberal 
network use. These effects are bound to be considerable as 
19 The elasticity of telecom output with respect to a demand 
shift is 1/b+g, where the demand shift is measured by 
the proportionate reduction in the average telecom tariff 
that rebalancing would permit. If a similar demand shift 
as above of 11.3 percent occurs, then with similar para-
meters, i.e. b = -0.2, g = 1.66. 
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well and will have to be added to the static welfare losses 
calculated here. 
3.4 Influence on Service Offerings 
Two of the Green Paper's recommendations are bound to influence 
the variety and range of service offerings if they are fully 
accepted. The first concerns the proposal to allow competitive 
services in competition with the reserved services provided 
for by the telephone administrations (they too, of course, 
may provide competitive services but it is in reserved services 
where they have an exclusive right). The other one concerns 
open non-discriminatory network access which should help to 
enhance the value added network market, especially if it is 
combined with a tariff harmonization that allows the abolition 
of current restrictions on network use. 
The competitive service offerings not only increase the spectrum 
of service offerings to the puQlic, but also allow some elements 
of ''network" competition to emerge, even if only in an indirect 
way.· The substitution potential to such non-reserved services 
may thereby also serve as an additional check on X-inefficiency 
of the PTOs which goes beyond the normal regulatory pressure. 
·rt is the second effect, however, that is of interest here. 
From a more harmonized, liberalized VANS market, additional 
service offerings are bound to arise. The precise effects 
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are difficult to quantify, depending on the actions of the 
PTOs themselves in this service area. The PTOs can be quite 
active, as for example the RTT or ·the DBP, or more passive, 
but with more infrastructure provision, as France Telecom, with 
the French Videotex example. What is essential for further 
service offerings is a good interface between infrastructure 
provision and VANS, independent of the activity level chosen 
by the PTO. 
It suffices here to outline some of the likely effects: 
The VANS may help in eliminating space as a geographic 
barrier to the spreading of certain services, as in the 
case of computer services. In the past, these services 
were linked to the location of computers. The linking of 
computers via a telecommunications network extends these 
services over a geographic area, just as the locomotive 
spread the power of the steam engine in the last industrial 
revolution. The "down sizing" of conputers and increasing 
availability of economic input-output devices enhances 
this effect; 
VANS aid the spreading of existing services from within 
organizations or large centres throughout the economy by 
making them available at economic costs to third parties. 
As a consequence, VANS create a larger geographic market 
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for already existing services and may lift some potential 
services beyond the "break-even market size". This implies 
the creation of new services that would not have been econ-
I( 
omic before {i.e. experts on Tap, telecommuting, increased 
user-friendliness, etc.); 
VANS help in the creation of new services that are made 
possible by the "economic" linkage of computers through 
telecommunications. 
VANS lead to the further integration of office functions. 
The integration of design, manufacturing and component 
production will bring us closer to the "Office" and the 
"Factory of the Future" with £Omputer-~ided ~esign {CAD), 
£Omputer-~ided ~anufacturing {CAM), !lexible ~anufacturing 
~ervices { FMS), etc. These developments bri_1g with them 
a large potential for electronic data ~nterexchange {EDI) 
that allows a further interlinkage of production and distri-
bution steps. 
- · This linkage will be aided by the increasing cheapness 
of band-width {for example through a European-wide broad 
band network) that will alter significantly the cost of 
image transmission and the availability of services that 
depend on them {i.e. three-dimensional simulation for re-
search in medicine, biology, chemistry; audiovisual educa-
tion techniques, videobooks and conferences, etc.). Tradi-
tional VANS like access to data banks will become quicker 
and cheaper. 
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These effects are difficult to quantify across the territory 
of the different national European operators because some 
of them are already heavily engaged in diversifying product 
offerings and encouraging VAN markets, while others are still 
busy establishing the infrastructure for voice telephony. 
We have therefore only been able to identify possible effects 
in a qualitative way. 
3.5 Influence of Harmonization 
Products and services which are standardized may become more 
valuable if they are compatible with each other or if they 
can be made compatible (through interfaces) at realtively 
low cost. But the competitive process might not always lead 
to such compatibility (Besen and Saloner, 1987). Individual 
producers, especially those which enter the market first, 
have an interest in maintaining incompatibility as a barrier 
to competitive entry. Even if compatibility is achieved, for 
example thrugh industry standards, this standard might be 
achieved too early or too late, depending on industry structure. 
Due to the massive sunk costs of the first emerging standard, 
consumers may be locked in to different and perhaps inefficient 
standards, as in the case of typewriter keyboards and TV sets 
(David, 1987; Crane, 1978). 
In order to correct for these market failure effects, govern-
ments must become involved in helping to set up standard-
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setting institutions. An industry-run approach alone, which 
could achieve the same result, brings with it the danger of 
cartelization. However, care must be taken to ensure that 
the overall welfare effects of such decisions are kept in 
mind. The experience of the telecommunication industry shows, 
however, that the government too may be either biased and 
set the standards too early or too narrow, keeping only its 
domestic market and industry in mind. Standard-setting organi-
zations with a larger georgraphic or even world market cover-
age, for example through the EEC or the International Telecom-
munications Union (like CCITT) may help to overcome this 
shortc?ming. Such a policy would also reduce the barriers 
to entry that often arise with national standard-setting. 
It 1s in this connection that the attempts of the Green Paper 
to increase harmonization has to be seen. The economic effects 
are likely to work similar to those observed in VANS in 
Section 3.3, namely 
a reduction in barriers to entry through increased market 
size will increase market growth and thereby also create 
learning and scale effects (for example in mobile radio); 
a lessening of monopoly power should reduce the price/cost 
margins and increase market size as well. 
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4. Results of the Scenarios 
4.1 A Status Quo Scenario 
The reference scenar1o, against which to compare the effects 
of the completion of the internal market will have to be a 
status quo scenario, in essence the "anti-monde''. Table 4.1 
gives an overview over the current institutional spectrum 
in European telecommunication markets, the constraints under 
which PTOs operate and the anticipated regulatory changes. 
Except for perhaps in Denmark and Great Britain, industrial 
policy goals in procurement still play an important role. 
This means that PTOs are forced to support their domestic 
industries, sometimes at a considerable cost (INSEAD, 1988). 
Denmark has been able to do without it because its local tele-
phone operating companies are almost too small to be "cap-
tured" by politicians or equipment producers. This has allowed 
its PTOs to be more interested in providing low cost service 
than pursuing an industrial policy goal. British Telecom has 
been forced to abandon its preferential and purchasing policy 
as a consequence of the emerging competition with Mercury. 
For customer premises equipment, however, the U.K. certifica-
tion scheme still retains a preference for domestic products. 
While complete state ownership of telecommunication administra-
tions is still the norm, the potential for private shareholdings 
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is increasing. In addition to Spain and Italy, where private 
firms have a large degree of public shareholding, the reform 
envisaged in the Netherlands by 1989 may eventually lead to 
private shareholdings as well, once the PTT is transformed 
into a stockholding company. Such transformations tend to 
reduce government constraints on procurement and tariff policy 
as the interest of private shareholders must now also be con-
sidered. 
The institutional link between telecommunication and postal 
services often creates extra financial burdens for the tele-
communications side. The separation of the two services, which 
has now been instituted in a number of countries, tends not 
only to prevent this development, but allows each of the organiza-
tions to be more flexible and go their independent ways. It 
is interesting to note that Germany too has proposed to move 
in this direction and a change in France seems likely, so 
that the major markets could eventually be freed from heavy 
cross-subsidy obligations. 
Network monopoly has only been abandoned in Great Britain. 
But the fact that private cable networks have been allowed 
to operate in a _number of countries might increase ~he like-
lihood that private (ROES) antennaes for satellite reception 
will also be liberalized. This development anticipates the 
liberalization of receiving only earth stations as envisaged 
by the Green Paper. 
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Technology is playing a strong positive role here, especially 
as the convergence between telecommunication and data processing 
is making the old boundaries of the interface between the 
regulated and the non-regulated sector obsolete. But the legal 
boundaries associated with the current legal status of the 
telecommunication authorities are so all-embracing in some 
countries that most data processing and especially value added 
services could theoretically be included in their jurisdiction. 
While this does not take place in practice, it leaves a con-
siderable amount of discretion with the network operator which 
in turn creates uncertainty for potential entrants in the 
field of competitive non-standard services. 
Where more than one network operator already exists, for example 
in the form of the state-owned company Telediffusion de France 
(to distribute broadcasting programs), the possibility to 
allow such entities to eventually act as separate network 
carriers increases and with it the likelihood of network com-
petition. This is expected to have important effects on effi-
ciency and tariff structure, as our discussion above has shown. 
Already now some countries have adopted the Green Paper recom-
mendation of sp~arating the regulatory authority form oper-
ating companies as in Great Britain and France. West Germany, 
Belgium and the Netherlands plan to do so in the near future. 
Moreover, some telecommunication administrations have set 
up separate companies to participate in competitive markets 
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(for customer premises equipment, VANS, information services 
etc.), thereby creating fairer competitive conditions with 
private firms and anticipating the recommendations of the 
Green Paper. French and Spanish telecommunication administra-
tions established such subsidiaries some time ago, while BT 
has only recently gone this route in order to better utilize 
the economies of scope that exist between network services 
and other activities. 
Greater problems exist with respect to the liberalized use 
and the cost based pricing of leased lines (an important pre-
condition for the development of value added and information 
services). All countr~es still maintain restrictions on the 
use of leased lines and may do so until 1992. It is in this 
area (along with a modification of the tariff structure) where 
large adjustments must still be made. 
The same is true with respect to the CPE market in which libera-
lization is progressing only slowly. Especially concerning 
the first telephone apparatus where most PTOs still maintain 
a service monopoly, a significant, unrealized competitive 
potential still exists. This has been exemplified by the recent 
U.S. and Canadian development as well as the newer U.K. ex-
perience. 
This overview of the status quo development shows already 
some moves towards implementing the recommendations of the 
Green Paper. But the most important issues remain in the area 
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of tariff policy, network access and a liberalization of the 
CPE market. Improved performance by the PTO, as a consequence 
of more liberalized procurement policies, increased operational 
efficiency and a move towards a more business like environment 
remains also a crucial issue. 
4.2 Recommendations of the Green Paper Fully Realized 
4.2.1 Keeping the Arena of "Reserved Services" Small 
We have seen 1n section 4.1 that already now the current national 
arrangements concerning the regulatory framework of telecommu-
nication operations are being revised. For workable competition 
to become more effective the regulatory framework must be 
changed further and effective boundaries and interfaces between 
"reserved services" and competitive services be drawn. Care 
must be taken on the one h,9-nd .~9. ensure the full exploitation 
of economies of scope that exist between network operation 
and other activities. On the other hand, antitrust issues 
must be kept in mind so that 
restrictions for the activities of the national telecommu-
nication administrations can be identified, which prevent 
unfair competition vis-a-vis private suppliers. 
Where the services the PTOs offer are available from third 
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parties as well this potentially fruitful competition can 
take place on an equal footing. 
This might even imply that some aspects of competitive 
activities might have to be regulated as well. But the 
question of regulating a competitive activity is clearly 
different from that of regulating a monopoly. 
Our analysis suggests that the legal monopoly area for "reserved 
services" can be defined much more narrowly, in line with 
recommendation B of the Green Paper. 
In this case, the qeustion of a proper interface between reg-
ulated monopoly areas and competitive activities becomes 
crucial, especially concerning the safeguards necessary to 
control the cross-subsidy potential that exists between regu-
lated monopoly markets and the competitive markets in line 
with the available instruments under Articles 85/86 and 90. 
At issue here is the ease of entry, the avoidance of predatory 
behavior, fair access to bottleneck facilities, etc. so that 
the benefits of competition can be fully realized. Advantages 
that occur naturally to the telecommunication administration, 
for example due to favourable access to information about 
customers (when the network operator also competes in the 
CPE or VAN market), the network interfaces (concerning value 
added networks) and the access to bottleneck areas must be 
considered with this objective in mind. 
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If the area of reserved services is kept small, it might in 
the extreme only entail basic dialled telephone services while 
giving up the monopoly on all CPE. This is the policy currently 
envisaged by the Bundespost after the recommendations of the 
Witte report. The U.K. has already gone this road and France 
as well, so it represents a realistic form for a scenario 
1n which the effects of recommendation B of the Green Paper 
are considered. 
But even if with the emergence of ISDN and the increased im-
portance of data and image transmission, the voice segment 
of the market declines to as much as 70 percent of total "pub-
lic" or- commercial telephony markets, it still leaves the 
majority of the service volume in the hands of the telephone 
administration. In purely quantitative terms, the likely effect 
of this recommendation may seem small, but the changed rela-
tionship with competitive service suppliers and the substitut-
ability (even if only limited) between "reserved" and "non 
reserved" services is bound to have an influence on the perfor-
mance of the network operator. We must therefore consider 
two effects: 
the potential market increase in the competitive area and 
the changed behaviour of the PTOs in the regulated area. 
The quantitative implications of the second effect, i.e. be-
cause of the changed behaviour in the regulated area, are 
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difficult to assess. Much will depend on the amount of "non reserved'' 
service offerings by private suppliers as a response to reserved of-
ferings and the interface and interaction between them. Our discus-
sion of VANS above suggests that a more liberal use of ''reserved" 
network services will also tend to encourage VANS, while keeping 
other parameters (including interface provisions) constant. This 
would suggest a relatively small additional impact on the regulated, 
reserved services in addition to that discussed in relation to VANS. 
4.2.2 Likely Effects from the CPE Market 
In the competitive area we are mainly concerned with CPE, 
VANs and services that arise out of the ONA concept. In the 
CPE market, the initial difference from status quo is expected 
to be small as well. But we expect a larger reaction of supp-
liers to lower barriers to entry and a significant increase 
in market size, so that significant changes are to be expected. 
A uniform EEC-wide type approval policy according to minimal 
standards (based exclusively on the safety of the user (avoid-
ance of first-party harm) and the network (avoidance of second-
party harm)), should result in a sizeable enlargement of the 
CPE market, increased product variety and a considerable cheapen-
ing of products. 
The effects of the completion of the internal market on the 
equipment industry have been dealt with above (INSEAD, 
1988), but they do have important implications for the network 
as well. Cheaper and more versatile terminals will also generate 
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extra network traffic, as more terminal functions may become 
integrated, leading to a substitution effect from physical 
communication, but also to a market extension effect, because 
competition is possible over a wieder ral)..ge. To the extent 
that liberalization of the CPE market lowers the price of 
telecommunications equipment it will reduce the cost of tele-
communications. If these cost savings are used to rent more 
access lines than there might be an increase in traffic volumes 
because of increased number of lines. According to analyses 
undertaken by Bell Canada, regarding the relationship between 
access lines and toll usage, a 1% increase in access lines 
would result in about a 2% increase in long distance traffic 
volumes, all other things equal. 
In Bell Canada's serving area of Ontario, Quebec and parts 
of the Northwest Territories, competition in the terminal 
equipment market was introduced in August 1980. Since this 
date, the business market has been characterized by more ag-
gressive marketing efforts than in the pre-competitive environ-
ment, resulting in faster technological innovations and new product 
introductions as well as a general decline in Key and PBX terminal 
equipment prices. These factors, taken together, appear to 
have stimulated the demand for business access lines. 
In a Bell Canada econometric model of business access demand , 
a proxy variable has been included to reflect the impact of 
such structural changes. The model results suggest that these 
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factors have indeed had a positive effect on the demand for 
business access lines. Since business access demand affects 
long distance traffic volumes, one may infer that these struc-
tural changes hav~ •. also stimulated long distance calling. 
~ 
Similar evidence is available for the U.S., where the CPE 
market was liberalized much earlier (Huber, 1987), however, 
just as in Canada, from a much more restrictive environment 
than that which characterizes the European CPE market, for 
example in France, Belgium, West.Germany and Italy. 
After a careful analysis of these developments and further 
interviews with industry experts, we assumed that an additional 
increase in telephone traffic of 5 per cent could be expected 
as a consequence of a European-wide liberal CPE certification 
and attachment policy. With unchanged telephone tariffs, this 
would mean l.Sbn ECU extra network revenue p.a. 
Since much of this traffic will benefit from economies of 
fill, requiring little further network investment, some tariff 
reductions might be possible as well. This could lead to a 
further tariff stimulus, especially in those countries where 
the substitution effects initiated by a move towards a more 
competitive CPE market are largest. There will also be some 
additional investment in CPE devices that may help to reduce 
users' telephone costs further, for example, related to tele-
phone answering machines, electronic mail, etc, though the 
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overall effects for the telephone administrations might not 
be as large. There will be indirect effects on the rest of 
the economy: 
reduced CPE equipment costs will free income for other 
purposes; 
substitution of physical information processes to tele-
communications will reduce production costs and enlarge 
the competitive arena; 
tariff savings through more advanced CPE equipment will 
reduce the telephone budgets of firms and households. 
The direct effects, 1.5bn ECU due to additional traffic will 
have to be considered in terms of opportunity costs. This 
can be interpreted in terms of .3bn ECU due to economies of 
.fill, plus the extra profits obtained from this additional 
service revenue, perhaps .15bn ECU, resulting in economic 
gains of .45bn ECU. The indirect effects could be between 
50 and 100 percent of this sum. (Tabelle 4.1) 
4.2.3 Likely Effects from the VANS Market 
Concerning VANS, exact figures about the European market size 
are rather vague; even for the U.S.A. only approximate figures 
are available. Revenues of the four prominent North American 
VAN carriers, Tymnet, Graphnet, ITT and Uninet, reached about 
$ 225m in 1984; services bureaus formed to provide remote 
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access to information earned about $ 52m in 1986, voice mail 
had reached $ 35m in 1983 and telephone conferencing $ 127m 
in 1983. For on-line data bases about $ 2bn was spent in 1986, 
a volume to be doubled by 1990 (IRD, 1983). 
Data about the European market is more difficult to obtain. 
For data banks on financial information, about $ 300m was 
spent in 1982, compared to 1.5bn in the U.S. in 1983. A Frost 
& Sullivan (1984) forecast predicts the market for VANS 1n 
Western Europe of $ 5.7bn (in 1984 prices) by 1990. Of this, 
$ 2.5bn is for telecommunication services, text and message 
services are expected to earn $ 1.256bn ~nd on-line data bases 
$ 1.3bn. The U.K. market is expected to continue to dominate 
this development, earning $ 1.375bn by 1990, to be followed 
by Germany with $ 1.34bn and France with $ 1.063bn. Italy 
and Scandinavia follow with slightly more than $ .5bn each 
and another billion to be achieved in the remaining 9 coun-
tries covered in this study. 
If one takes this Frost and Sullivan revenue forecast for 
PTO revenues seriously, almost half of the revenue will be 
accruing to the PTOs. The behaviour of the PTO and the regulatory 
ease with which the development of the VAN market is permitted, 
will therefore be crucial to this scenario. 
It is our opinion, that the full implementation of the EEC's 
recommendation in the Green Paper would be the minimum amount 
of institutional change necessary to achieve such growth rates. 
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Our interviews and literature research so far suggest that 
most value added networks currently spend at most 10 - 15 
percent of their sales volume on PTOs' services, making them 
less vulnerable to high tariffs and restrictive use of the 
telephone network. The Frost & Sullivan estimates for revenues 
accruing to PTO (50%) is overly optimistic, however. But the 
degree to which liberal network use and cheap transmission 
facilities are available is crucial to the further development 
of this market. Predicting such high growth rates for services 
with relatively little value added (compared to costs of carrier 
services) means that much of the more price elastic apllication 
segment of VANS will dominate the market growth. The PTT revenue 
of 2.5bn ECU by 1990 might therefore be an estimate on the 
high end, at least as far as PTOs' revenues are concerned. 
To achieve such figures would require not only a very cooper-
ative approach by the PTOs, but also an increasing coordina-
tion of standard-setting at the European level as envisaged 
by the Green Paper. We would attribute at least half of this 
growth in transmission volume, namely 1.2bn ECU to be related 
to achieving the goals of the Green Paper. In terms of oppor-
tunity cost, we again consider 20 percent due to economies 
of fill, i.e. 0~25bn ECU, plus 10 percent due to the profit 
on extra network services, i.e. 0.12bn ECU, in total .3-.4bn 
ECU. ( Table 4.1) 
In addition to liberal network use and cheap transmission 
facilities, a further aspect crucial for the growth of VANS 
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is that of Open Network Architecture2 ~ Through it, providers 
of VAN services can have easy access to the public network, 
employing all the tools of traffic economy in the process 
as well as the utilization of the increasing intelligence 
in the network {such as reversed charging, closed user groups, 
diagnostic and control options). If the ONA concept 1s success-
fully implemented, we envisage that a number of VAN services, 
and also information and add-on services that have only a 
marginal application at the moment {for example, because of 
high transaction costs), may increasingly become economical. 
This might also lead to private households becoming more inter-
ested in these services, especially on the higher income end, 
thereby greatly increasing the volume for such services and 
the amount of revenue generated within the network. As a con-
sequence, the 2.5bn ECU figure mentioned by Frost & Sullivan 
could easily be increased ty another 50 percent by 1992 to 
3.75 bn Ecu! 1 Employing the same calculations as above, this 
20 Here the aim of the Co::nmiss,ion' s proposal is to provide for 
the stu~y of user requirements for non-discriminatory access 
t? ~ubl1c telephone networks, for which an open network pro-
VlSlon concept will have to be provided. 
It is ~ifficult.to break this aggregate estimate down by 
c?untr1es, but 1t would also not be a very meaningful exer-
Clse. Many of these services will have relatively high fixed 
costs, ?n~e the~ have been set up, it is only their marketing 
and adrn1n1strat1ve cost, which will count as a variable cost 
Having a larger unified EEC-wide market available in which t; 
mark~t these-services '~ill greatly increase their growth po-
tentlal as well as attracting extra entry. 
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adds another benefit in the neighbourhood of .2bn ECU by 1990, 
and O.OSbn ECU in terms of the calculations for 1985. 
4.2.4 Other Effects 
The Green Paper also env1sages an improved regulatory structure 
through the separation of the regulatory from the operational 
responsibility and a strengthening of the antitrust provisions. 
This should facilitate the interface of competitive services 
with "reserved'' services, thereby encouraging entry and a 
widening of service options, whose quantification is, however, 
beyond the scope of this research report. Similar effects 
are expected as a result of increased standardization efforts 
in services. Increased compatibility would have a cost-reducing 
effect in terms of resources saved, as well as a market enlarge-
ment effect as a consequence of lowPr service costs. Again 
we have not attempted to quantify these effects here. 
4.2.5 Weak Provisions for increased Performance and Tariff 
Rebalancing 
However, in thi!? "Green Paper" scenario there is little incentive 
to harmonize tariffs, irrtplying that at the level of the member-
. states, many of the current allocative costs of tariff distortions 
are maintained or perhaps even increased, not to speak of the 
associated dynamic costs. This latter possibility is indeed a 
real one, as technical change is occurring much faster 
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than tariffs are being adjusted. 
Furthermore, we see little effects from the current regulatory 
change on the existing differences in operating efficiency 
between different networks. This would imply that further 
welfare and efficiency gains in the neighbourhood of 10 percent 
of present PTO revenue are still possible, that could accrue 
~n addition to the benefits mentioned in the area of CPE, 
VANS and ONA development. It is for this reason that we explore 
below also a scenario of full network competition, even so 
it is at the moment politically unfeasible. 
4.3 Full Network Competition 
4.3.1 Regulatory Parameters 
The regulatory framework in which full network competition 
might take place has already been outlined. Before proceeding, 
a number of other parameters have to be establ~shed, however, 
since they too influence the competitive effect that is likely 
to result from introducing network competition. 
The different parameters we have in mind refer to 
the current distribution of customers and the traffic 
pattern within and between countries; 
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the cost structure of the existing telecommunication admin-
istrations and 
the degree of asymmetric regulation eventually pursued 
to encourage network competition. 
The first parameter is important because any network competitor 
will first aim for the largest customers and the routes which 
carry the heaviest traffic. 
The existing cost structure indicates the eventual competitive 
advantage of a new network, independent of any scale effects. 
Asymmetric regulation refers to the extent to which the current 
telephone administrations are prevented from reacting to entry, 
even if they themselves have a cost advantage vis-a-vls new 
entrants. 
Further obstacles must also be considered, such as the problems 
which are encountered in obtaining access to "right of way", 
to microwave sites and to the local loop, for example through 
interconnection agreements. 
4.3.2 Tariff. Rebalancing 
Even if a reasonable regulatory framework concerning these 
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regulatory parameters is adopted, as for example in the U.K., 
in Japan or the U.S., new networks entry will require a two-
year build up period before they can connect their first custo-
mers. They will not be in full operation for another year 
or two, giving established telephone administrations enough 
time to adjust tariffs and performance and to react to the 
expected competitive pressures of network entry. The evidence 
from those countries which have experienced network competition 
suggests however that incumbent operators reacht through in-
creased performance and a realignment of tariffs in anticipa-
tion of the entry. Local rates and rentals are normally raised 
to eliminate loss-making activities, while long-distance and 
international rates came down. The size of the expected tariff 
adjustment as a consequence of network competition, depends 
on the current amount of_cross-subsidization taking place. 
If access charges to the local loop are levied on entrants, 
a certain amount of cross-subsidies may continue without ... 
further entry. 
Our considerations in section 3.2 have shown that connection 
and rentals barely cover their costs, as do local calls. Detailed 
calculations for France show that local calls cover only 50 
perent of their cost, while long-distance rates are about 
30 percent above costs. Similar or even larger tariff dispersions 
exist in the other member states, except perhaps in the U.K. 
If the cost estimates from section 3.2 are at all accurate, 
a sizeable tariff rebalancing would therefore be possible, 
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with associated welfare benefits particularly in those countries, 
where trunk calls are priced very high and local calls are 
considerably underpriced (see Table 3.6). In these countries, 
welfare losses might well be above the 10 percent figure on 
total call volume obtained for West Germany. Excluding the 
already partially rebalanced U.K. indicates welfare effects 
in the neighborhood of 4bn ECU for the EC as a whole. (Table 4.1) 
These welfare effects are not directly comparable to oppor-
tunity costs saved, for example due to improvements in pro-
ductivity because of an abolishing of internal market boundaries. 
On the other hand, they represent increases in consumer satis-
faction and, because of a closer move to cost, important price 
signalling effects in those markets where telecoms services 
are used as an input. 
4.3.3 Effects on Productivity 
The.amount of the productivity improvement as a consequence 
of.network competition is difficult to estimate. Our compa-
risons of the Bundespost and BT with Bell Canada in Section 
3.1 suggested that a 25 to 50 percent higher growth rate in 
·productivity may be possible. With productivity growth cur-
rently ranging from 1 to 2 percent, an increase of at most 
1 percentage point p.a. seems possible. Equal effects may 
- 170 -
-80-
be possible for Belgium, Italy and Spain.22 In terms of resources 
saved, this is equivalent to .6bn ECU p.a. (Table 4.1) 
If one extrapolates this trend to the year 2000 and assumes 
that these productivity gains are fully passed on in further 
tariff reductions beyond the rebalancing effects already men-
tioned above, the additional demand effects could be sizeable. 
Assuming that the estimated price elasticity for trunk calls 
was -0.7 and taking account of the additional exploitation 
of economies of scale as a consequence of higher growth rates, 
a further 20 percent reduction in the real telephone cost 
between now and the year 2000 could easily gain extra traffic 
of 10 percent. 
Such an acceleration of productivity could, if all the extra 
profits were passed on in terms of lower tariffs, maintain 
the current level of profitability of the major network operator. 
If entry leads to considerable excess capacity in networks 
and a subsequent shake-out, rates of return on investment 
might go down during the adjustment period. It is difficult 
to forecast if the long-term rate of return on investment 
would be different from today, since that depends to a large 
extent on the regulatory environment chosen and the riskiness 
of the investment. 
22 We have not been able to extend the analysis to the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Greece and Ireland. 
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4.3.4 Effects on the VANS Market 
If the open network access solution of the Green Paper is 
successful, we would expect much more efficient network uti-
lization, implying still higher rates of total factor produc-
tivity, at least during the transition to a new equilibrium. 
This does not necessarily result in higher profits, however, 
since competitive entry ought to ensure that at least in the 
long term competitive rates of return - adjusted by the relative 
investment.risk- are observed. But together with the expected 
tariff rebalancing and the absence of user restrictions on 
leased lines, the effects in the VANS market ought to be sig-
nificant. This can also be seen from a recent analysis of 
the German market (von Weizsacker et al., 1987) where the 
losses from a continuation of the existing restrictive tariff 
policy are compared to a more liberal VANS policy. 
The underlying model of von Weizsacker is based upon the assump-
tion that the demand for VANS expands as experience accumulates. 
Learning takes place through consumption instead of, as more 
usually, through production. A- 'tax' (in the form of volume-
·related tariffs on leased lines as currently practiced by 
the Bundespost) reduces demand for VANS and thus, by reducing 
the amount of learning associated with the cutoff consumption, 
raises production costs above what they would otherwise have 
been. 
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Von Weizsacker considers two scenarios: the first a closed 
economy and the second, open. Assuming a price elasticity 
of demand of -0.25 and a learning parameter of 0.685 then, 
although the welfare loss in 1987 is only 1/8 percent of VANS 
revenues, by 2007 it has reached 1/3 percent of GNP while 
the demand for VANS is to be about 8 percent of GNP. 
In a world economy a country can import or export VANS. When 
the domestic institutional environment is less than optimal 
these services will be imported because domestic supplies 
will not flourish. On the one hand the possibility of imports 
implies the "closed economy estimates" are upward biased, 
on the other, export possibilities give an opposite bias. 
The production costs of VANS, excluding transmission, are 
once and for all software development, a fixed cost. Hence 
the larger the market served, the lower the cost per customer 
and the greater the variety of services. In the second,open 
market scenario, von Weizsacker assumes 
(i) German suppliers have a 75 percent market share in 
Germany and a 2.5 percent market share outside, and 
(ii) the world market is ten times the German. 
He then supposes 
(a) market shares are unchanged and both markets grow at 
the same rate. He compares this position with scenario 
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(b) the German market grows more slowly so that even with 
market shares unchanged German suppliers' global market 
share falls. 
The market share product quality feed-back now reinforces 
the previously discussed learning-effect. These effects together 
with the tax(through volume charges) on leased lines, cause 
a substantial deterioration in the German balance of trade. 
Assuming an initial market share in the reference state of 
9.09 percent, the German share falls to 5.6 percent by 2007, 
also assuming a growth parameter of 0.68 and that home market 
shar~ never falls below 40 percent. The German domestic market 
share falls from 3/4 to 1/2, the trade deficit rises from 
0 to 42.18 bn DM and the welfare losses in terms of GNP effects 
amount to more than 1 percent by 2007. 
With these magnitudes it is clear that there would be a con-
siderable divergence between EEC countries over the next twenty 
years if some choose not to liberalize their VANS network 
and others do. Moreover, since .VANS are tradeable, the VANS 
90mpetitiveness of Western Europe as a whole will be retarded 
by the reduced l~arning experiences, contributing to a lower 
income than necessary anj a balance of trade deficit, as 
American and Japanese VANS suppliers enter. 
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4.3.5 Further Secondary Effects 
There are a number of further secondary effects to be considered. 
First is the effect on investment. Allowing network competition 
will obviously bring more investment into the network, especially 
if it was cash-starved in the past. Even if it was not, the 
extra investment to take place can be sizeable. In the U.K., 
Mercury had investment £ 200m by the end of the 1985-86 financial 
year; calculations for France show that an investment volume 
for a separate network operator may be FFr 1.3bn, distributed 
over the period 1988 to 1992. Furthermore, if demand elasticities 
are at all as high as Table 2.7 indicates, additional "derived'' 
demand for investment would take place, once tariffs have 
been lowered as a consequence of higher productivity. 
The second kind of investment expansion will take place for 
the established network operator and is likely to be larger 
in magnitude. He will not only have to increase his own capacity 
(i.e. as a consequence of increased "derived" demand, where 
he had to lower his price as a consequence of rebalancing), 
but he will also have to replace his existing equipment in 
the network much faster because of quicker equipment deprecia-
tion. In other words, the entry of competitors with more modern 
equipment will necessitate for the established network operator 
a departure from traditional accounting rules to more economi-
cally based depreciation rates. This will only be a transitory 
phenomena, but should still bring about a sizeable investment 
boom. 
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We also expect a larger amount of labor shedding, as networks 
will be forced to rationalize under a competitive threat and 
equipment manufacturers face a harsher competitive climate 
1n which preferential procurement prices will be more difficult 
to maintain. This will be especially significant in those 
countries, where rationalization in the network and the equip-
ment industry has been prevented for political reasons. 
Because of the effects of network competition, other political 
influences will be reduced as well, for example to continue 
the cross-subsidy of postal services, to continue excessive 
R&D and export support for the equipment industry, to pursue 
a more regional policy etc. This would have the obvious benefits 
of bringing about a more coherent telecommunications policy, 
but it would eliminate all the distributive policies currently 
pursued through ~ariffs, procurement or hiring. A uniform 
national tariff policy could only be pursued under strict 
regulatory rules of interconnection and access charges; other-
wise route-specific de-averaging would mean that the denser 
routes are priced lower than the thin routes and traffic to 
outlying areas. 
In sum, the benefits of integrating a European market under 
a liberalized network scenario are not so much felt as trade 
effects as few of these services are actually traded, but 
they occur more as indirect competitive effects. A larger 
European market would, of course, facilitate the establishment 
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of separate carriers, which would be much more difficult na-
tionally. While some elements of this scenario might be po-
litically unrealistic, it shows that the effects of a more 
coherent long-term telecommunication policy of the EEC are 
truly worth working for. 
4.4 A Summary 
Table 4.1 summarizes the main results of the two scenarios. 
The major difference between the two is the greater effect 
of a competitive procurement policy and of tariff reform under 
network competition. Without a network monopoly, entry, even 
if only on the fringes, forces PTOs towards a more cost con-
scious procurement and operating policy and, as we see under 
point 3.3.~a policy of tariff rebalancing. The example of the 
Swedish PTO - Televerket - shows that such policies are also 
possible without network competition, but our interviews in 
the different countries suggest that industrial and regional 
policy considerations, labor market obligations and union 
pressure prevent the PTOs from carrying them far enough. The 
increased pressure the .EC is putting on tariff harmonization 
is therefore a ~tep in the right direction, as is the policy 
on VANS and ONP. But only if the regulatory framework can 
be strengthened to increase performance and if the PTOs are 
released of the other policy task by pursuing them through 
more direct policy tools (taxes, subsidies, retraining, etc.) 
will more rational tariff and operating policies result. 
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Table 4.1: Effects of Regulatory Reform on European 
Telecommunication Services {1985) 
Measures/Effects 
1) Lower equipment cost 
Implies lower tariffs 
and through network ex-
pansion, utilization 
of economies of fill 
and scale 
2) Keepinq Arena of 
"Reserved Services" 
smn.ll 
Implies increased prod-
uct spectrum and market 
enlargement effects 
3) More ,competitive "Non-
reserved Services" 
3a) easier CPE certi-
ficationJincreased 
product variety, 
lower CPE prices, 
increased network 
use (by 0.6 -
0.9 bn ECU) 
3b) liberalized VANS 
3c) open network pro-
vision 
4) Improved regulatory 
structure, facilities 
·entry, competitive 
interface 
5) Standardization, com-
petitive interface 
6) Tariff Reforms(closer 
to cost) 
7) Improved operating 
efficiency 
Green Paper Effects Full Network 
Competition 
Effect 
2-4 bn ECU p.a. 4bn ECU p.a. 
(not to be double counted) 
0.75 bn ECU p.a. slightly 
larger 
not estimated not estimated 
0.25 - 0.5 bn ECU direct 
plus 0.2 bn ECU indirect 
resource savings (p.a.) 
0.3 - 0.4 bn ECU by 1990 
i.e. 0.1 bn ECU p.a. 
0.2 bn ECU by 1990 
i.e. 0.05 bn ECU p.a. 
not estimated 
not estimated 
marginal effects (no 
EEC instruments as yet) 
marginal effects (no 
EEC instruments as yet) 
not estimated 
larger, 
because fewer 
network 
restrictions 
not estimated 
same 
same 
4 bn ECU p.a. 
0 . 6bn ECU p. a .. 
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The likely effects of the Green Paper towards the completion 
of the internal market by 1992 are of a sizeable magnitude, 
but the remaining policy problems are large enough to warrant 
further efforts, before the market for telecommunications 
services are truly integrated in such a way, that their full 
technology potential can be realized on an EEC-wide basis. 
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APPENDIX I Input and Output Definitions Used. 
A) Output Measurement 
Ideally the output measure would include both the quality 
and the quantity of service in all dimensions1 waiting time 
for connections, length of haul, duration and time of day 
for calls. The output measure actually computed, in general, 
consists of three categories, inland calls, international 
calls and 'other' output. Access was not included as an 
output on the grounds that it is an input derived from the 
demand to make and receive calls. There is the 'option 
demand' argument for including access as an output but the 
true output in this case is the exercise of options. 
Call volume is reported as number of calls in some countries 
and number of meter pulses in others~ with no standard 
length of time for a pulse (or billing unit). Even if the 
measurement was common it would still fail to include the 
characteristics of the call. In order to standardise inland 
call output the total revenue from inland calls for each 
country was divided ~hrough by the appropriate price, to 
determine how many short haul (5kms) calls of three minute 
duration could have been made. An alternative output 
measure was computed in terms of long haul calls (500kms) 
of a similar duration. This procedure indicates sensitivity 
of output measures to different national pricing policies 
with respect to distance. Where total number of calls is 
available this is used as an additional measure. 
Output for international calls was standardised in a similar 
way. Total revenue from international calls for each country 
was divided through by the appropriate national cost per 
minute of a call to the USA. The USA was considered the 
most appropriate country to use for standardisation, being 
a more equal distance from all European countries than any 
one European country would be. 
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Constructing an index for the remaining category of output 
proved more difficult because of the diversity of outputs 
provided by carriers and the aggregative method of reporting 
them. A physical measure should ideally consist of numbers 
and types of leased lines, telex lines and calls, radiopagers, 
mobile telephones, VAS, etc. As a physical measure we used 
revenue deflated by the price index for an average business 
telephone bill. A business index is used as it is assumed 
business subscribers are more likely to use these 'other' 
outputs than residential subscribers. 
These standardised measures of output were weighted, firstly, 
according to their own share of revenue in total revenue 
(without access revenue) and, secondly, by hypothetical cost 
elasticities. A lower and upper limit is used to test the 
sensitivity of results to plausible different elasticities. 
As -a lower (higher) limit 0.4 (0.5) is used for inland calls, 
0.05 (0.1) for international calls and 0.15 (0.3) for 'outer 
output'. The implied overall cost elasticities were 0.6 and 
0.9, that is a one per cent increase in aggregate output 
raises costs by 0.6 and 0.9 per cent respectively. 
The average wait before being connected to the network is 
one (negative) dimension of output in which BT scores well 
in international comparisons. Whereas Telefonica in Spain 
has an average seven month wait, BT claims to have eliminated 
its waiting list completely. In principle, a national carrier 
could reduce its costs by not maintaining sufficient spare 
capacity to connect new customers immediately. Therefore, 
some relative waiting time, weighted by the negative of the 
appropriate ~ost elasticity, should enter the output index. 
However because it is believed to be small it was not included 
in the output measure. Nor have international variations in 
the quality of service to existing customers been taken 
into account. 
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B) Input Measurements 
Labour 
In addition to the number of manhours worked, the structure 
of the workforce must be considered, for this influence the 
overall quality and productivity of labour. 
We calculated: 
number of skill 
adjusted workers = 
= 
total staff cost 
annual cost of 
a PTT basic skill worker 
WLt + Nit + PCt 
WLi + Nii + PCi 
where WL = wage bill 
NI = national insurance payments 
PC = pension contributions 
t = total workers 
i = basic skill worker 
The justification for this adjustment is as follows. 
Suppose there are t~ree types of labour Ll, L2, L3 paid 
wages Wl, W2, W3 and with marginal productivities dQ/Ll, 
a Q/L2, '0 Q/L3. Category 1 is the basic ski 11 leve 1 and 
~Q/L2,3>0Q/Ll. The total wage bill is WlLl + W2L2 + W3L3. 
Our skill adjusted labour input in terms of the basic skill 
worker hour equivalent is therefore 
Ll + (W2/Wl)L2 + (W3/Wl)L3 
Since 'd Q/2/'0 L2 /'0 Ql (iJ Ll then W2 / Wl and L2 labour 
receives a ~eight in the labour aggregate which reflects 
its superior marginal productivity over the basic skill 
category. In this way we standardise for international 
differences in the skill composition of the labour force. 
As a different average number of hours was worked different 
telecom organisations the physical measure was converted 
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into total skill adjusted manhours per year. This was 
calculated by multiplying the number of skill adjusted 
workers by the average hours worked per annum per worker. 
The average number of hours worked has been assumed to 
allow for part-time working. One possible drawback is that 
overtime working is not incorporated into our calculations. 
However, as far it has been possible to ascertain, overtime 
is only significant in Britain. 
C) Capital Input Measurement 
Where measures were available for inputs used for investment 
the physical input was reduced appropriately. Generally, 
inputs used for capital account work here confined to labour 
but in some cases the physical measure of materials input 
was also adjusted. 
In order to compute a physical measure of land and buildings 
input, we divide the value of land buildings asset by the 
average rental price of a square metre of warehouse 
accommodation. We use an average rental price from European 
Marketing Data and Statistics, Table 122. This gives us a 
physical measure in total square metres. 
For the trunk network we convert transmission kilometres 
into digital channel kilometres. The standard system size 
internationally is 1,920. Therefore, we multiplied microwave, 
coaxial and optical fibre kilometres by 1,920 to get a 
common measure of digital channel kilometres. 
We then imputed rentals for each category of capital, 
i.e. r = (d + 1) Pk 
where Pk is the price of a unit of capital 
d is the depreciation rate 
i is the rate of interest. 
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The rate of interest is constant for each of the four 
categories but the depreciation rate varies for each, 
according to the lives assigned to the assets. 
In practice physical measures for four aspects of capital 
were calculated: 
(1) land and building in square metres, 
(2) number of vehicles, 
(3) local network in numbers of access lines, 
(4) trunk network in digital channel kilometres. 
The weights assigned were their own proportionate share of 
the total imputed cost, where the total imputed cost is the 
sum of the imputed rental values of all capital inputs, 
expenditure of materials and staff costs. 
D) Material Input Measurement 
The diversity of inputs in this category made standardisation 
in a physical index difficult. The method chosen was tr 
divide the expenditure through by the nation~! average wage 
rate per hour in each country to derive a common measure of 
'labour equivalent units of input'. 
E) Data Sources 
The main source of data is the annual Reports and Accounts 
and supplem~ntary publications by the PTTs. Where there are 
omissions in the data more detail has been obtained from 
the organisations concerned. One obvious problem with the 
data is that accounting procedures and reported categories 
differ between organisations making comparisons difficult. 
BTs financial year runs from April 1st to March 31st while 
other telecom organisations use a calendar year. 
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